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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This Report discusses the first three years of the programme of research, funded by the 
Leverhulme Trust, on the Future of Trade Unions in Modern Britain.  The projects are organised 
into a number of strands: membership; interaction with employers and the state; adapting to 
change; performance outcomes; and the public sector and public policy.  There are some themes 
which run right through these strands including what unions do for employees, unions’ internal 
organisation and how unions interact with employers. 
 
Our research draws on many disciplines including industrial relations, economics, law, 
history, geography and organisational behaviour.  Much of it is truly interdisciplinary.  For 
example the project on union recognition blends the law and work organisation.  And research 
on what unions achieve for women dovetails economic analysis, psychology and a spatial 
element.  All the standard methods of social science investigation are being used.  For example 
the work on family friendly policies has used both statistical analysis to interpret data from the 
1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) and detailed case studies.  The 
research on recognition and membership uses case studies, own surveys and statistical analysis 
of secondary data.  It is our firm intention to continue to draw on a variety of disciplines and 
methods of investigation during the remainder of this programme.  Some important findings 
from the research are set out in the box below. 
 
The original research programme was detailed in previous annual reports and details of 
the research team are listed below.  The organisation of the research has evolved over 2000-
2002.  John Pass replaced Lesley James on the Steering Committee in 2002.  With the 
permission of the Trust, we added six Research Associates: Alex Bryson of PSI, Rafael Gomez 
of the LSE Management Institute, Diane Perrons of the LSE Geography Department and Keith 
Ewing Law at King’s College London.  Professor Ewing replaced Paul Davies, whose 
appointment as Deputy Chair at the Central Arbitration Committee meant he could no longer 
participate in the recognition project.  Stephen Bach (Kings College London) and Robert Taylor 
(ex-Labour Editor, Financial Times) joined as Research Associates in October 2002 to further 
strengthen our research on the public sector and public policy.  Some new areas of research 
were added including unions and the new economy, and the application of marketing theory to 
union activity, public sector, and the public face of unions.  Five colleagues – Andy Charlwood, 
Helen Bewley (née Gray), Vidu Badigannavar, R?is ín Ryan-Flood and Rebecca Givan – are 
making excellent progress towards completing their PhD’s, using their research done for the 
programme.  We are fortunate in CEP because we can draw on the expertise of our Data 
manager and IT co-ordinator whose efforts have been especially valuable to colleagues using 
sophisticated quantitative techniques. 
 
CEP culture is to put real effort into dissemination and we have taken trouble to bring 
our work to a wider audience (documented more fully in the Dissemination and Impact section).  
It is worth highlighting here the successful event each Spring, attended by some 40 colleagues 
mainly from the labour movement, and the academic workshop at Christmas where we expose 
our research to our peers.  We were also active in conferences, policy advice and the media.  We 
have a major publishing agreement with Routledge for three edited volumes (spring 2003, 2004, 
2005) to distil the output of the programme for a wider audience. 
 
We wish to express our thanks to a number of colleagues.  In 2000-01 Professor Barry 
Supple and the Leverhulme Trustees were, as ever, supportive and flexible (for example 
concerning the new areas of work).  Lord McCarthy, the Trust’s then monitor, made a number 
of constructive suggestions during the year which contributed to the success of the programme.  
The new Director of the Trust, Sir Richard Brook, has been equally supportive.  Our Steering 
Committee all helped, both behind the scenes – for example with access – and at the various 
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events they attended.  We know how busy these six colleagues are and their support is therefore 
all the more valuable.  Practitioner and academic colleagues who attended Spring dissemination 
events and December workshops were very constructive and unfailingly helpful concerning the 
progress of our research.  Many of the projects trespass on the time of industrial relations 
practitioners – mainly union officials – and we appreciate their backing at what is a difficult but 
exciting time for the union movement. 
 
The report is organised as follows.  Programme members are listed.  Then our progress 
on research is set out.  Each chapter has an eye on the big question: do unions have any future in 
modern Britain?  Dissemination and impact is then discussed briefly.  Full details on 
conferences, events and publications are set out at the end of the report. 
 
A sample of findings 
 
· Age matters a lot in explaining union decline in the UK. This applies to both age of worker and age of 
workplace. Statistical evidence controlling for other factors shows newer workplaces to have 
substantially lower rates of unionisation than older workplaces, and young workers to be substantially 
less likely to join trade unions than in the past. If unions are to regain an important role in the economy 
it is vital that they reverse these age related trends and successfully organise new workplaces and new 
entrants to the workforce. 
· Union membership is declining as a proportion of the workforce in Britain not because unions have 
done a poor job of servicing their existing membership base, but rather, because they have not organised 
a new generation of workers – those that started working in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. 
However, all is not lost for unions since there are substantial pockets of workers in many segments 
(youth, ethnic minorities, retail workers) who desire some form of union representation. Employer 
opposition is not the only reason why these workers who desire representation are not getting it. 
Unionisation is an experience-good so unions can do a lot more to lower the “sampling cost” of 
unionisation. This is important, since workers who have either direct or indirect experience with a union 
– either through family and friends or at work – are more likely to be members and/or express a 
willingness to join a union in the future. 
· Performance-related pay is now a widespread feature of the UK labour market. While such pay systems 
pose a direct challenge to the “rate for the job” rule traditionally favoured by unions, they also generate 
new demands for employee representation as a means of ensuring their fair and transparent operation. 
· A matched pair comparison of NHS trusts with and without partnership agreements revealed that a 
significantly larger proportion of employees in the partnership NHS trust rated their union to be more 
effective, as compared to their counterparts in the non-partnership NHS trust in: being open and 
accountable to the members, sharing information about employer and workplace and working with 
management to improve quality and productivity. However, there was no significant difference reported 
in the union’s ability to win fair pay increases, protect workers against unfair treatment, promoting 
employment security, promoting retraining and redeployment wherever possible in case of 
redundancies, ensuring redundancies if any are voluntary and, negotiating a fair redundancy package. 
· The union wage premiu m has been in decline since the mid-1990s. By 2001 the premium appears to 
have disappeared. Union impact on productivity and financial performance is also much attenuated now. 
· Unions reduce wage dispersion and increase the likelihood that employers promote equality of 
opportunity. However, fear of victimisation, a reluctance to pay union subscriptions amongst the low 
paid, and the perceived irrelevance of unions to skilled workers who are able to find alternative 
employment relatively easily, dissuade worke rs experiencing discrimination from unionisation. 
· The statutory union recognition procedure under the Employment Relations Act is working much as 
intended: it is providing a right to union recognition where it can be demonstrated that the majority of 
the workforce want it, it is robust against judicial reviews, it is being used as a last resort, and it has 
stimulated voluntary recognition. Nonetheless use of it in multi-state firms is constrained and 
employers’ tactics may be adversely affecting the success of cases. Its impact on union membership and 
collective bargaining coverage is limited as the number of new recognitions remain low. 
· In the private sector, Britain has moved away from a negotiation-based and towards a more information- 
and consultation-based system of employee representation. The new EU Directive presents challenges 
for trade unions, but also opportunities which they are well placed to exploit. 
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Chapter 1 
British Unions: What Future? 
David Metcalf 
 
Summary 
 
· At its peak UK membership stood at 13 million in 1979 but haemorrhaged 
5.5 million in the subsequent two decades. Presently 29% of employees 
belong to a union, 3- in-5 in the public sector but under 1- in-5 in the 
private sector. The sustained decline in membership in the 1980s and 
1990s was a consequence of interactions among the composition of the 
workforce and jobs; the roles of the state, employers and individual 
workers; and of unions own structures and policies. 
 
· Unions now impact only modestly on pay, productivity, financial 
performance and investment. The negative association between 
recognition and employment growth, even assuming it is not causal, will 
depress future membership if it continues. Unions are a force for fairness 
in the workplace; they narrow the pay distribution, boost family friendly 
policy and cut accidents. 
 
· There are around 3 million free-riders and another 3 million employees 
who would be very likely to join a union if one existed at their place of 
work. The challenge for the union movement is to organise these workers 
(a twentieth a year is 300,000 extra members) while still servicing their 
existing 7 million members. 
 
 
British unions presently cover 3-employees- in-10. Membership declined by over 
5 million in the two decades after the 1979 zenith of 13 million. The future of British 
unions turns in large part on what they do – to economic efficiency, fairness and to 
industrial relations. Any resurgence of unions depends on where the new jobs are, 
support from the state, interactions with employers and unions’ own servicing and 
organising policies. Union membership, impact and future will be considered in turn. 
 
 
Membership and decay 1980s, 1990s 
 
Membership figures 
Union membership rose by 4 million between 1950 and 1979. At its peak UK 
membership stood at 13.2 million in 1979 but haemorrhaged 5.5 million in the 
subsequent two decades (see table 1.1). Presently union membership is 7.55 million, 
consisting of 7.25 million employees and 0.3 million self-employed people. Since the 
Blair government came to power in 1997 the number of employees who are members 
has been roughly constant at around the seven and a quarter million mark. This is 
equivalent to a density figure (i.e. percent unionised) of 29% (see chapter 2). 
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Table 1.1 
Trade union membership and density, UK 
 
 Membership 
(000) 
Density 
(% of workforce) 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
2000 
 9,289 
 9,835 
 11,178 
 12,947 
 9,947 
 7,779 
40.6 
40.9 
45.9 
49.0 
35.3 
26.2 
 
Notes and sources: These membership data come from the Certification Officer but are self-
reported by unions and include some retired, unemployed and non-UK residents. The latest 
Labour Force Survey results (autumn 2001) indicate that in the UK there are 7.55 million 
members including 0.3 million self-employed and that 7.25 million employees (29.1%) are 
union members. 
 
 
Density alters by demographic, job and workplace characteristics. It varies 
little by gender or ethnic origin but rises with age, falling off slightly past age 50. 
Those with higher education have density levels substantially above those with fewer 
qualifications. Teachers, nurses and other professional workers have the highest 
density of any occupation (48%) and sales occupations the lowest (11%). Density 
rises sharply by tenure, a mirror image of the well known finding that labour turnover 
is lower in workplaces which recognise a union. 
 
Small workplaces (under 25 employees) have density levels less than half 
those of larger establishments. People who work in public administration, education 
and health are far more likely to be members than those employed in business services 
or hotels and restaurants. In the public sector 3-employees-in-5 are members but the 
corresponding figure for the private sector is fewer than 1- in-5. Manufacturing now 
has a union density (27%) below that for the whole economy (29%). And an 
individual is more likely to belong to a union if she or he lives in the northern part of 
the UK than in southern regions. 
 
The number and structure of unions has altered dramatically too. A century 
ago there were 1300 unions and at the end of World War II there were still nearly 800. 
Mergers, takeovers and the decline of unions for specific craft groups like the Jewish 
Bakers and Sheffield Wool Sheep Shearers has reduced this figure to 226. Indeed, the 
11 unions each with over 250,000 members now account for almost three quarters of 
total membership. But some small unions do survive – including the Association of 
Somerset Inseminators and the Church and Oswaldwistle Power Loom Overlookers 
Society. 
 
Going hand in hand with the decline in union penetration has been a profound 
change in the type of mechanisms that provide employees with a voice – a big switch 
away from representative voice to direct voice. Representative voice occurs via a 
recognised trade union or works council. Direct voice bypasses these intermediate 
institutions. Instead, management and employees communicate directly with one 
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another through, for example, team briefings, regular meetings between senior 
management and the workforce and problem solving groups, such as quality circles. 
Between 1984 and 1998, the proportion of workplaces with only representative voice 
arrangements halved, while those relying just on a direct voice nearly trebled. What 
happened was that unionised workplaces added complementary direct communication 
systems, while nearly all new workplaces opted for direct communication methods 
without recognising unions. 
 
The decline in membership 
How can the relentless, sustained decline of membership in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century be explained? There is no single factor. Rather it was 
the consequence of interactions among the composition of the workforce and jobs; the 
roles of the state, employers, and individual workers; and of unions own structures 
and policies. 
 
It used to be thought that the business cycle also helped explain membership 
such that persistent unemployment led to declining density. But since 1993 
unemployment has fallen continuously and so has density – the reverse of predictions 
from business cycle models – so this explanation can be ruled out. 
 
Shifts in the composition of the workforce and jobs are one ingredient. More 
highly unionised sectors like cars and ships or the public sector, and individuals with a 
greater likelihood of being a member – males or full-timers for example – now 
account for a smaller proportion of total employment. So, as a matter of arithmetic, 
union membership also falls. It turns out that such composition effects are less 
important than commonly realised, accounting for around a quarter of the fall in 
membership. Rather, the bulk of any explanation turns on convergence of membership 
within groups: unionisation of men has fallen to a similar rate to women and some 
convergence has also occurred for unionisation rates between full- timers and part-
timers, large and small workplaces, and manufacturing and non-manufacturing. 
 
Activities and policies of the state affect union membership both directly, for 
example by legislation promoting or undermining union security, and indirectly via its 
influence on the environment in which employers and unions operate. In the 1980s 
and 1990s the environment in which the social partners conducted their activities was 
profoundly affected by the onslaught on public sector activities and greater emphasis 
than previously on product market competition. Public sector unions faced 
privatisation, compulsory competitive tendering and contracting-out. Collectivism 
was damaged by taking a million nurses and teachers out of collective bargaining. 
And in the private sector by promoting company-based payment systems like profit 
sharing and employee share ownership schemes through tax breaks (although there 
was surely no market failure to justify this) while disabling public protection for the 
lower paid by abandoning both Fair Wage Resolutions and wages councils. Product 
markets were altered for ever by abandoning state subsidies to sectors like coal, steel 
and shipbuilding, axing exchange controls and, less obviously, by policies such as 
selling rather than allocating commercial TV franchises and building the channel 
tunnel. Each of these policies had the side effect of rupturing the sometimes previous 
cosy relationships between capital and labour. 
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Industrial relations legislation plays a more direct role in the ebb and flow of 
membership. In the 1980s legislation impaired union security by weakening and then 
outlawing the closed shop and interfering in check-off arrangements. The strike threat, 
a fundamental source of union power, was weakened by a succession of laws which 
permitted a union to be sued, introduced ballots prior to a strike, and outlawed both 
secondary and unofficial action. This legislation simultaneously raised the cost of 
organising and reduced the costs employers face in opposing unions. 
 
Did employers become more hostile to unions in the 1980s and 1990s? There 
is no evidence that union activity – the wage premium causing higher labour costs for 
example – resulted in a higher rate of closures among union plants compared with 
their non-union counterparts. Nor did management embark on wholesale 
derecognition of trade unions: the derecognition rate was around 1% a year between 
1984 and 1998. Although derecognition in some national newspapers, TV and docks 
generated bitter industrial disputes and considerable media interest, such management 
action was quite rare. 
 
Rather, union decline turns mainly on the inability of unions to achieve 
recognition in young workplaces reflecting, for example, Thatcherite views among 
some managers and the growth of investment from overseas. In 1980 three fifths of 
establishments under 10 years old recognised unions, similar to the fraction of 
workplaces 10 or more years old (.65). But over the next two decades unions found it 
progressively harder to organise new workplaces. By 1998 just over a quarter of 
workplaces under 10 years of age recognised a trade union, only half the 
corresponding figure for older workplaces. This inability to get much of a foothold in 
new workplaces was not confined to private services. More stunning was the virtual 
collapse of recognition in newer manufacturing plants. Only 14% of manufacturing 
workplaces set up after 1980 recognise a union compared to 50% of those established 
in 1980 or before. 
 
One key advantage to the individual employee of belonging to a union is the 
wage premium compared with equivalent non-members. This premium was 
approximately constant at around 10% in the 1980s but at least halved in the 1990s – 
indeed some studies report there is no longer any premium to joining a union. Partly 
as a consequence of such lower benefits to membership there has been a large rise in 
the fraction of the workforce that has never been a union member, up from 28% in 
1983 to 48% in 2001 (see chapter 3). It is not that extant members are quitting but 
more that unions cannot get individuals to join in the first place. Another facet of 
declining overall membership is the ebbing of density where unions are recognised. 
Younger employees are much less likely to belong to a union than older workers and 
this gap in membership rates by age has grown dramatically recently. This is a 
worrying trend from unions’ viewpoint because such non-membership is prone to 
persist across generations. Therefore union membership in the future turns on getting 
recognised in newer workplaces and attracting younger employees into membership – 
a difficult task if they (or their parents) have never experienced membership and if the 
benefits of membership are demonstrably, or perceived to be, below those two 
decades ago. 
 
Unions’ own structures and policies matter too (see chapter 6). Consider a 
couple of examples concerning structure. It took some unions like TGWU and ASLEF 
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some time to align the shop steward role in a decentralised system with the need for a 
national voice. And what was the rationale for mergers? Many were simply market 
share unionism – shuffling around existing members – rather than designed to achieve 
scale economies in order to release resources for organising. 
 
Policy was often not clear either. The balance between servicing existing 
members and organising new ones was not always thought through. And, till recently, 
concerns of female members – work/life balance, parental leave etc – have had low 
priority. In dealing with employers the union movement took an age to come to terms 
with the break up of national bargaining in the private sector and single union deals. 
Recent emphasis on cooperative industrial relations (“partnership”) hints that these 
lessons have now been learnt. 
 
It is not surprising that union membership plummeted in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The conjunction of hostile forces played a major part. How could unions resist the 
altered structure of jobs, rising unemployment (in the 1980s and 1990s), a hostile 
state, more intense employer opposition and the growth of individualism? Unions do 
not thrive in adversity. In the 1950s and 1960s under the post war settlement and the 
growth of the welfare state unions flourished. Then, in the 1970s, when that 
settlement disintegrated the union movement was well dug in – the fifth estate of the 
realm which many joined even if they disliked it. But in the last two decades of higher 
unemployment, altered industrial structure and intense product market competition 
unions needed the support of workers and employers. By and large they did not get it. 
What had previously been conforming behaviour – to recognise and to belong to a 
union – became deviant. 
 
 
What do unions do? 
 
Forty years ago Alan Flanders, the most perceptive contemporary observer, 
suggested that unions have both a “vested interest” and “sword of justice” effect. The 
vested interest impact, similar to the monopoly face of unions set out by Richard 
Freeman, turns on unions’ influence on pay, productivity, profits, investment and 
employment. The question is, essentially, what effect do unions have on workplace 
and firm performance? The sword of justice – vividly described by Flanders as 
unions’ “stirring music” - is more about fairness and due process. In addition unions 
also impact on employee relations through their bearing on the industrial relations 
climate and job satisfaction. These will be considered in turn. 
 
Workplace performance 
If the presence of a union in a workplace or firm raises the pay level, unless 
productivity rises correspondingly, financial performance is likely to be worse. If the 
product market is uncompetitive this might imply a simple transfer from capital to 
labour with no efficiency effects, but it is more likely to lead to lower investment rates 
and economic senescence. In the 1970s and 1980s the evidence indicated that union 
members received a pay premium, but without the corresponding rise in productivity. 
If anything demarcations, unofficial industrial action and multi-unionism lowered 
productivity. Hence profitability in workplaces with union recognition was below that 
in non-union workplaces. But, as we saw above, the world has moved on: what effect 
have those changes had on workplace performance? 
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One major reason for belonging to a union is, historically, because union 
members have received a pay premium (“wage gap”) over similar non-union 
members. A recent exhaustive survey concluded that for the 1980s “the consensus in 
the literature was that the mean hourly wage gap was approximately 10%”. The 
outlawing of the closed shop in 1990, falling density where unions are recognised, 
more intense product market competition and the loss of nearly 6 million members 
was bound eventually to result in a lower wage premium. And so it has – evidenced in 
a number of recent studies (see chapter 8). 
 
Machin’s study is particularly informative and is summarised in table 1.2. For 
men, the wage premium fell from 9% in 1991 to zero in 1999, while for women it fell 
from 16% to 10% over the eight years. More importantly, there is now no (wage) 
benefit to joining a union and no cost to leaving. Machin summarises his work: “For 
men it used to pay to be in a union [in the early 1990s] and it used to pay to join a 
union, but by the end of the 1990s it does not. For women the answer is: it does still 
pay to be in a union, but not by as much as it used to, and it does not pay to newly 
join”. 
 
By the end of the 1990s the average union-non-union differences in labour 
productivity were also negligible. But there are two sets of circumstances when union 
recognition continues to be associated with lower labour productivity. First, 
productivity is lower in workplaces with multi-unionism and fragmented bargaining. 
But such multi-unionism is now rather unusual – only 7% of workplaces are 
characterised by fragmented bargaining. Second, when the product market is 
monopolistic, with just 1-5 competitors, productivity is also lower. 
 
In the past, the impact of union recognition on wages and productivity fed 
through into an adverse effect on profitability or financial performance. Now the re are 
no significant overall links, on average, between union presence and financial 
performance – reflecting the weaker union impact on both pay and productivity levels 
that unions now have compared with one or two decades ago. But, again, this 
“average” result conceals some interesting findings. Multi-unionism still results in 
worse financial performance where the bargaining remains fragmented. Where the 
firm recognises a union it will have a less good financial performance if the union 
organises under half the workforce: encompassing unions yield superior performance 
to weaker ones. Finally, the product market remains crucial. Any union effect turns on 
there being few competitors in the product market – permitting unions to switch some 
of the surplus from owners of capital to labour. 
 
Thus, on average, the impact of unions on firms’ pay, productivity and 
profitability is small and probably confined to monopolistic and/or multi-union 
workplaces. In these circumstances it is not surprising that there is also no strong 
evidence that union recognition hinders investment in plant and machinery. Indeed, 
the evidence on investment in human capital is that unionised workplaces invest more 
in their workforce than their non-union counterparts. But one profoundly worrying 
trend remains for unions. Other things equal, employment in a unionised workplace 
grows some 3% a year more slowly (or falls 3% a year more quickly) than in a non-
union workplace. Even though it is unlikely that union activity is itself the cause of 
this differential change in employment – which has now been in evidence for 20 years 
– if it persists the implications for future membership levels are very serious. 
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Table 1.2 
Union wage effects 1991, 1995, 1999 % 
 
 Cross section Joiners  Leavers  
Males    
 1991  9  9  -13 
 1995  6  0  0 
 1999  0  0  0 
    
Females    
 1991  16  15  -14 
 1995  16  6  -8 
 1999  10  0  0 
 
Notes and sources: Data came from British Household Panel Survey and full details of 
Machin’s study are in Metcalf (2003). 
 
Sword of justice 
Any impact of trade unions on economic performance is more muted than it 
was twenty years ago. But unions still wield the sword of justice in the workplace. 
Unions narrow the distribution of pay, promote equal opportunity and family friendly 
policies, and lower the rate of industrial injuries. 
 
The spread of pay among unionised workers is smaller than the spread among 
their non-union counterparts. This is because unions protect the pay of those on low 
earnings and because unionised workplaces make more use of objective criteria – 
seniority for example – in setting pay rather than subjective factors – like merit-
preferred in non-union establishments (see chapter 7). Unions also compress the pay 
structure between different groups in the labour market: women and men, blacks and 
whites, and those with health problems and the healthy. If there were no unions the 
gender pay gap would be 2.6% wider and the race pay gap 1.4% bigger. These are 
very substantial effects. When the national minimum wage was introduced in 1999 it 
had specially favourable influence on female pay – two thirds of those affected were 
women – but it only narrowed the gender pay gap by a little under 1%. The impact of 
unions on narrowing the gender pay gap is three times as strong as that of the national 
minimum wage. 
 
Union recognition is associated with a much greater likelihood of the 
workplace having some form of equal opportunity policy and an array of family 
friendly policies designed to encourage female employment (see chapter 9). These 
practices include parental leave, working from home, term only contracts, the 
possibility of switching from full- to part-time employment and job shares. Women in 
unionised workplaces are much better off in terms of career opportunities, flexible 
work arrangements and general support for family responsibilities than their 
counterparts in non-union workplaces. 
 
Such family friendly policies go hand- in-hand with better performing 
workplaces. An establishment with an array of family friendly policies has a greater 
likelihood of above average financial performance, labour productivity, product or 
service quality, and lower quit and absentee rates than a workplace without such 
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practices. Even if the causal mechanism behind such associations is unclear this 
evidence is surely something for unions to build on in their attempts to appeal 
simultaneously to management and workers. 
 
Unions also cut industrial accidents. An accident in this context is where an 
employee has sustained any one of eight injuries during working hours over the last 
12 months, including bone fractures, burns, amputations and any injury that results in 
immediate hospitalisation for more than 24 hours. Unions tend to organise in 
workplaces where an accident is more likely to occur, but their presence lowers the 
rate by a quarter, compared with non-union plants. This favourable effect lowering 
accidents occurs because unions lobby for safety legislation and take industrial action 
locally to make the workplace safer. Many trade unions also provide health and safety 
courses. Further a union presence will tend to promote “voice” over “exit”: where a 
union is recognised, employees with concerns about accidents are more likely to be 
listened to rather than labelled as a nuisance.  
 
Effect on industrial relations 
A union presence also influences workers’ perceptions about the governance 
of their organisation. Workplace governance includes: the climate of relations 
between management and employees; the trust employees have in their managers; and 
managerial performance. On average workplace governance is perceived as poorer 
among employees in workplaces with recognised unions, relative to their counterparts 
in non-union establishments. Better perceptions about governance in non-union 
workplaces may flow from the use of direct voice – briefing groups, team meetings 
and the like – rather than representative voice via the union, discussed above. 
 
This “average” finding is only part of the story. Once the decision is taken to 
recognise a union, governance is profoundly affected by the way the parties go about 
their business. First, governance is perceived to be better when there is a balance of 
power between management and union in the workplace. Very strong or very weak 
unions detract from a good climate or high trust. Second, when the union is 
recognised it is better for management to support membership: recognition coupled 
with hostility to individual membership produces the worse outcomes. Third, unions 
are perceived to be more effective when workplace governance is good. Managers’ 
perceptions of the climate of employee relations have also been analysed and confirm 
the thrust of these findings concerning individual employees. Unions with on-site 
representatives, which have the capacity to operate as a strong voice for workers, or a 
strong agent for the employer, are held by managers to generate a good climate. The 
implications are clear cut. Once the decision is taken to recognise a union it makes 
sense to encourage membership and ensure that the union is effective representing 
employees. This suggests, for example, that partnership arrangements promoting 
cooperative employee relations are likely to yield superior governance to adversarial, 
fragmented relations. 
 
Membership or non-membership of a union may also influence job 
satisfaction. The standard finding is that union members are less satisfied in their jobs 
than otherwise similar non-members. This is normally attributed to union voice 
politicising workers, but our research suggests otherwise. Rather, lower job 
satisfaction among union members flows from the type of employees who become 
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union members and the type of workplaces that employ them – unions themselves do 
not lower satisfaction in the job. 
 
 
The future: dissolution or resurgence? 
 
How might unions reverse declining density and achieve a sustained rise in 
membership? Broadly there are two routes to revival. Either employment in unionised 
sectors of the economy has to grow relative to non-union employment or unions must 
engage in more intense organising activity and enhance their appeal to both employers 
and potential members. 
 
It is unlikely that any boost in the aggregate number of jobs will occur 
disproportionately in the unionised sector. In the (highly unionised) public sector, 
while the number of teachers, nurses and police is rising, overall there will not be 
much growth in employment in the next decade. In manufacturing, employment now 
is only a little over a third of its 1966 peak; anyway unions find it just as difficult to 
get recognised in new manufacturing plants as in private services. Similarly there is 
no suggestion of strong growth in jobs in utilities or transport. It is likely, instead, that 
the major share of any growth in employment will occur in private services with a 
present union density of 15%. So disproportionate growth in employment in the union 
sector is not the route to the restoration of unions’ fortunes. 
 
Alternatively, unions can invest more in organising and servicing activity, 
which may yield a larger return presently than in the last two decades because the 
climate of opinion fostered by the state is no longer hostile to collective labour 
institutions. But the allocation of such servicing and organising investment requires 
considerable thought. Consider table 1.3: 36% of employees are covered by collective 
agreements but over one third of these (14%) are free-riders, not members of a union. 
Looking at the evidence the other way round, a quarter (7%) of total union members 
(29%) are not covered by collective agreements. This includes teachers and nurses 
whose pay is settled by arbitration rather than collective agreements. And in the last 
decade many (particularly smaller) workplaces have abandoned collective bargaining 
without actually derecognising the union. By far the majority of employees (57%) are 
neither covered by a collective agreement nor a union member. The evidence in table 
1.3 provides remarkable food for thought for unions. 
 
First, servicing those members covered by collective agreements remains a 
priority particularly in the public sector, the bedrock of union membership (see 
chapters 10 and 11). Second, absorbing the free-riders – so-called “in-fill” recruitment 
– might be an attractive (cheap) method of boosting membership. Third, retaining 
those members where the firm no longer engages in collective bargaining may prove 
difficult – the union must convince such workers that membership is still worthwhile. 
Fourth, and most difficult, making inroads into the 14 million who are neither covered 
by collective agreements nor members is vital for any resurgence. But there is a 
delicate balancing act here: organising expenditure on this group represents a “tax” on 
existing members, who may then become free-riders if subscriptions rise to finance 
the necessary organising. 
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Table 1.3 
Coverage of collective agreements and union membership 
UK employees in employment, autumn 2001 
 
  Covered by collective agreement 
  Yes No Total 
Yes 
5.5m 
22% 
 1.7m 
 7% 
 7.2m 
 29% 
 Union 
member 
No 
3.4m 
14% 
 14.1m 
 57% 
 17.5m 
 71% 
 
 Total 8.9m 
36% 
 15.8m 
 64% 
 24.7m 
 100% 
 
Source: Calculated from Kevin Brock “Trade union membership: an analysis of data from the 
autumn 2001 LFS”, Labour Market Trends, July 2002, 343-354. 
 
Example: 8.9 million employees (36%) are covered by collective bargaining.  Of these 5.5 
million (22%) are union members and 3.4 million (14%) are not union members. 
 
 
Around a fifth of these 14 million workers either desire union representation 
or would be very likely to join a union if one were available. This suggests a 
“representation gap” of some 2.8 million employees, a potentially rich pool of 
employees for unions to organise. However, to achieve recognition, these employees 
need to be concentrated by workplace or there will never be a union available in the 
workplace. There are some interesting occupations involved here. Recently MSF-
Amicus signed up some 2000 Church of England clergy who have no employment 
rights – their employer is held to be divine not earthly. And the GMB has had some 
success in recruiting lap dancers. 
 
Such recognition occurs voluntarily, or via the law. Voluntary recognition 
stems either from true love (cooperation between capital and labour), or a marriage of 
convenience (a pragmatic second best). The legal route, inevitably associated with 
adversarial industrial relations, is a shotgun marriage, imposed on a resistant employer 
by an arm of the State. Under the legal route, if a union can prove a majority of 
membership in the bargaining unit, then it gains recognition. If not, a ballot is held in 
which the union must win 50%+ of the votes cast in the ballot and must have at least 
40% of the workforce in the bargaining unit voting “yes”. 
 
The direct effect of this law is tiny (see chapter 4). Fewer than 20,000 workers 
have been covered by recognition orders since the law came into effect in 2000. 
However, its indirect or shadow effect is larger. Over 1000 voluntary agreements – 
partnerships or marriages of convenience – have been signed in the last three years 
bringing around a quarter of a million new workers under recognition. But the union 
focus remains traditional: (ex-) public services, manufacturing, finance and transport 
and communication. Only one- in-six newly covered workers are in the rest of the 
private sector. 
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It is plausible that, in the longer run, the passage of the EU Directive on 
Information and Consultation will influence unions’ futures rather more than the 
recognition law (see chapter 5). It establishes, for the first time, permanent and 
general arrangements for information and consultation for all workers in the UK in 
organisations employing more than 50 employees. It will cover three quarters of the 
British labour force. Some employers may see this as an opportunity to create weak 
voice mechanisms; for others it may constitute a chance to institute stronger 
arrangements complementing other aspects of human resource management. The 
tough job for unions is to build on these schemes and to maintain and expand their 
role within them. The evidence seems to be that a union presence complements these 
arrangements and makes them more effective. 
 
In broad terms there are just over 3 million free-riders and just under 3 million 
employees who would be very likely to join the union if one existed at their place of 
work. If unions could organise annually a twentieth of this 6 million pool of potential 
members their fortunes would be transformed. The challenge for the union movement 
is to organise these extra 0.3 million members a year while still servicing their 
existing 7.2 million members. 
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Chapter 2 
Union Membership  
Andy Charlwood 
 
Summary 
 
· Unions negotiate on the behalf of 35% of employees and 29% of employees 
are union members. 
· There is significant demand for union membership and union representation 
among non-union employees. However, this demand is likely to be soft, so 
vulnerable to employer opposition. 
· Increased investment by unions in organising and the introduction of the 
statutory recognition procedure appear to have halted union decline, but have 
not brought about resurgence in union membership. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Union membership is central to the question of whether or not British unions 
have a future. The UK’s decentralised collective bargaining system means that unions 
are reliant on members for financial resources and bargaining power. The period 1980 
- 1997 was marked out by the most severe and sustained decline in collective 
bargaining coverage and union membership in the history of the British labour 
movement. Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s union membership fell by over 5 
million, from over half to under one third of employees. Coverage of union 
recognition for the purpose of collective bargaining halved from over 70% to 35%. 
Since 1997 union membership levels and collective bargaining coverage have 
remained fairly stable but there is, as yet, little sign that unions will be able to regain 
the ground that they have lost.  
 
If there is to be a wider revival of the labour movement, unions will have to 
begin to reverse the decline in membership and recognition. The two are intimately 
related: “It [union recognition] is the only way you’ll hold the members on anything 
other than a short term basis. We’ve found it again and again. You can build up 90%, 
close to 100% organisation, and if you can’t get the recognition and hold it, they will 
disappear. This is the common rule in all sectors – if you can’t get the recognition it 
dissipates.” Union General Secretary interviewed by Wood & Moore. Unions may 
also be able to grow by signing up free riders in workplaces and companies where 
unions already have collective agreements, but where union organisation is weak.  
 
Assessing whether or not unions will be able to bring about such a revival is a 
multifaceted problem which bears a resemblance to a jigsaw puzzle – different 
projects within our research program represent different pieces of the puzzle which 
need to be put together before the big picture can be understood. The different 
projects – or pieces in the jigsaw - can be broken down into five broad areas:  
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· The causes of union decline 
· The level of desire for unions among employees, and the factors and processes 
that cause this desire to be translated into membership  
· Management response to union organising attempts  
· The role of the state in regulating industrial relations  
· The level and competence of union organising activity. 
 
 
Causes of union decline  
 
Machin has identified a key cause of decline in union recognition; workplaces 
established since 1980 are much less likely to recognise unions than workplaces 
established before 1980. Changes to the economy and the political and legal 
framework governing trade union behaviour appear to have had a debilitating effect 
on the ability of trade unions to organise workplaces, particularly new workplaces. In 
the 1980s and 1990s management had both greater incentives and greater opportunity 
to remain union free. However, there is more to the story of declining union 
membership than declining leve ls of workplace union recognition. For example 
Millward, Bryson and Forth’s analysis of successive Workplace Employee Relations 
Surveys suggests that since 1990 membership has declined substantially in 
workplaces where unions have a continuing presence.  
 
Charlwood has developed this analysis to identify how much the observed 
decline in union density can be attributed to compositional change, increased free 
riding and declining collective bargaining coverage. Overall, compositional change 
explains around a quarter of decline, decline in collective bargaining coverage one 
third and increased free riding the remainder. However there are marked differences 
between the public and private sectors.  
 
In the public sector, compositional change accounted for about half of the 
decline in density. Most of this compositional change came about because new 
workplaces employed a different type of workforce to workplaces that closed or 
shrunk to less than 25 employees. The remainder was explained by increased free 
riding in both old and new workplaces. 
 
By contrast, in the private sector compositional change had only a minimal 
effect. The majority of membership decline was accounted for by declining collective 
bargaining coverage. The main reason for the decline of collective bargaining 
coverage was the total abandonment of collective bargaining as a method of wage 
determination in one in three private sector workplaces that bargained with unions in 
1990 and were still in existence in 1998. This axing of collective bargaining was 
specially noticeable for smaller workplaces. Only a quarter of workplaces that had 
ceased to bargain had formally de-recognised trade unions. Free riding also increased 
in new workplaces compared to workplaces that closed or shrunk (the full results of 
this analysis are reported in table one). 
 
These results should make chilling reading for trade unions. Many workplaces 
where collective bargaining was abandoned continue to have significant bodies of 
union members. But membership is likely to dwindle unless the union can force 
management to resume bargaining. In the absence of union de-recognition unions are 
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Table 2.1 
The components of decline in aggregate union membership density 1990 – 1998, percentage points 
 
 All   Private 
Sector 
  Public 
Sector 
  
 Continuing 
workplaces 
Leavers and 
joiners 
 
All 
workplaces 
Continuing 
workplaces 
Leavers and 
joiners 
 
All 
workplaces 
Continuing 
workplaces 
Leavers and 
joiners 
All 
workplaces 
Compositional 
change  
 
-3.41 .08 -3.33 2.06 -0.6 1.46 -4.04 -1.72 -5.76 
Change in 
collective 
bargaining 
coverage 
 
-3.3 -1.14 -4.44 -6.32 -2.74 -9.06 1.08 -.02 1.06 
Behavioural 
change  
 
4.94 -9.99 -5.05 1.41 -3.91 -2.5 -3.58 -3.65 -7.23 
All -1.77 -11.05 -12.82 -2.85 -7.25 -10.13 -6.54 -5.39 -11.93 
Source:  Andy Charlwood (2002) 'The Anatomy of Union Decline in Britain 1990 - 1998', CEP Working Paper 1224. 
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not able to use the law to force the employer to resume bargaining. Wood and Moore 
found that the NUM tried to take such a case against RJB Mining, but the case was 
thrown out on the grounds that a recognition agreement already existed. There is a 
catch-22 here. Apparently a voluntary recognition agreement does not require the 
employer to bargain in good faith. Yet the existence of such a voluntary agreement 
prohibits use of the statutory procedure. 
 
Bryson and Gomez have already shown that membership decline is not being 
driven by large numbers of employees leaving unions. By far the largest group of non-
union members are employees who have never joined a trade union. We aim to 
develop this finding by measuring the individual level changes behind union decline 
in the 1990s. The rise of never membership points to a further key challenge for trade 
unions: how to appeal to non-members? 
 
 
Non-union employees 
 
We have approached the question of non-union workers attitudes to union 
membership and representation from three different directions. Diamond and Freeman 
began by examining the attitudes of young workers towards unions. They found that 
young workers have very little practical knowledge of trade unions, and in the 
absence of a union at their workplace, they quickly adjust to the workplace they have. 
Subsequent research confirmed that this finding is equally true for older workers. This 
‘incumbency effect’ is potentially problematic for unions because essentially satisfied 
workers who value the status quo will be less willing to support union organising 
campaigns if stiff employer opposition raises the likely cost to the worker. However 
this does not mean that non-union workers do not desire union membership and union 
representation.  
 
Bryson and Gomez examined desire for union voice among different segments 
of the workforce. They found significant “frustrated demand” - a desire for union 
voice among employees in non-union workplaces. Frustrated demand was particularly 
noticeable in the retail sector and among younger workers. Charlwood examined the 
influences on non-union workers willingness to join a union. He found that at around 
15% of non-union employees would be very likely to join a union if one were 
available with a further 25% reporting that they were fairly likely to join. The key 
influence is a belief that unionisation will improve working conditions. Workers 
resident in traditionally unionised parts of the country, and workers with left of centre 
political views were most likely to have this belief. Although there was a 
comparatively low level of hostility towards unions, a clear majority of workers 
thought that a union would make little difference to their workplace.  
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that unions will struggle to motivate 
non-union workers to unionise in the face of concerted employer opposition, because 
most workers seem to anticipate fairly low benefits from union membership, while 
employer opposition can raise the cost substantially. 
 
Our collective results have led Bryson and Gomez to question the standard 
theoretical model of union joining. Economic theory regards union membership as a 
‘search good,’ this means that workers will search for union jobs if union status brings 
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with it valued outcomes like higher pay. However, the findings of Bryson and Gomez 
and Diamond and Freeman suggests that already unionised workers value union 
membership highly even if the actual benefits are low. Charlwood found that workers 
in traditionally heavily unionised areas of the country, and workers with left of centre 
political views were substantially more willing to unionise than the rest of the 
population. These findings all point to the idea that union membership is an 
‘experience good’. This means that workers who have experienced union membership 
(either directly through the workplace, or indirectly through family and social 
networks) will value it regardless of the specific benefits, while those who have not 
experienced unionism will have little interest. This theoretical development is 
important because it suggests both that unions face a tough challenge in reaching the 
‘inexperienced’ but that union survival does not rest solely on the ability of unions to 
maintain a wage mark up to attract workers. 
 
 
Employer opposition 
 
A key determinant of the costs of unionisation is the response of the employer 
to union organising activity. High cost responses include sacking union activists and 
threatening job losses if employees support unionisation. Employers may also seek to 
pre-empt unionisation by expanding non-union mechanisms for employee voice. 
Wood, Moore and Willman found that the clear majority of employers were not 
disposed to recognise unions unless they had to, so employer opposition is to be 
expected. Preliminary analysis of data from Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) 
cases suggests that a minority of employers are adopting militant anti-union tactics. 
For example Kelly and Badigannavar have found that the online book retailer 
Amazon successfully fought off a union organising campaign. In the aftermath of the 
campaign’s failure key activists were dismissed. 
 
 
State regulation 
 
The most important piece of state regulation for the future of union 
membership is the statutory recognition procedure (SRP) which became law in June 
2000. Wood, Moore and Willman have been following the workings of the procedure. 
The procedure seems to be having little direct impact on union membership: between 
November 2000 and October 2001 just under 3,000 workers (plus around 5000 from 
voluntary agreements within the procedure) have come under collective bargaining as 
a result of recognition cases resulting from the CAC procedure, and half of these were 
from a single agreement at the Honda factory in Swindon. Rather, the SRP appears to 
have cast a significant ‘shadow’ resulting in employers concluding voluntary 
agreements with unions. For example, Unison were able to sign an agreement with 
Compass group covering 50,000 contract catering staff in the NHS once it became 
apparent that a legal route to union recognition was to be introduced. Approximately 
200,000 to 250,000 new workers have become covered by collective agreements since 
the SRP became a realistic proposition in 1997, with significant year-on-year 
increases in the numbers being organised. This represents a considerable increase in 
organising activity. However, our analysis suggests that the SRP has not led to a 
dramatic reversal in union fortunes. Since the SRP was introduced there have been 
small aggregate increases in the absolute number of employees who have their pay 
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determined by collective bargaining. But the proportion of employees covered by 
collective bargaining has continued to fall. Unions are running faster, but they still 
cannot keep up with the expanding new economy. 
 
 The state also has an important role as an employer. The public sector is the 
area of the economy in which unions have most members and influence. The ability of 
unions to represent the pay grievances of public sector workers who, through the 
years of Conservative government, have seen their pay levels decline relative to their 
private sector counterparts will have an important impact on wider public perceptions 
of union effectiveness. The government’s response to these claims may have an 
impact on perceptions of union legitimacy. Therefore public sector trade unionism, 
and the contentious alliance between trade unions and the New Labour government 
are important strands of our current research activities. Specifically, Taylor will be 
tracking the forthcoming campaigns over the future of union political ballots, 
monitoring the success of union lobbying over the form of the consultation and 
communication directive and analysing the impact of generational change among 
union general secretaries. 
 
 
Union organising 
 
In some cases the statutory recognition procedure will result in the recognition 
or re-recognition of unions in workplaces with existing membership. In other cases 
recognition will be the result of targeted union recruitment campaigns. Wood, Moore 
and Willman have investigated union recruitment and organising policies. These 
policies do seem to be delivering results, for example the successful recognition 
campaign fought by the AEEU at the Honda factory in Swindon mentioned above. 
But these successes are not being replicated on a large enough scale to increase the 
proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining. However, it is important to 
note that there is more to success in this area than an immediate increase in members. 
For example the AUT’s organising campaign among contract research staff at the 
University of Aberystwyth only resulted 20% of the potential bargaining unit joining, 
but an activist group was formed which is building a self sustaining workplace 
organisation. If significant increases in union membership and union bargaining 
coverage are to occur, it seems that further increases in organising activity and 
increased investment in this activity will be necessary. The key questions are whether 
investment in new organising will be increased and sustained and whether 
membership and organisation can be sustained beyond the initial organising 
campaign.  
 
Union organising is often portrayed as a ‘tax’ on existing union members 
because it is they who bear the cost of paying for the campaigns. However, this need 
not be the case. If we assume that average union membership fees are £100 per year, 
if a union organiser recruits 500 new members in the course of a year, they will have 
contributed £50,000 to union funds. This sum is likely to be enough to pay the 
organiser’s salary and expenses. 500 recruits per year is actually a rather modest 
target: Amicus AEEU expects newly appointed organisers to recruit 1000 members a 
year. Given the clear financial benefits which would seem to flow from even quite 
modest levels of organising success, the failure of the union movement to invest more 
in organising is something for unions to ponder. 
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Conclusion 
 
Research completed so far points to the possibility of a future for British 
unions. They continue to represent around a third of British employees and play a 
particularly prominent role in the representation of public sector workers. There is 
also some demand for union membership and union representation among non-union 
employees. However, future union membership gains are likely to depend upon a 
fairly low level of employer resistance, the continued smooth running of the SRP and 
sustained and significant investment by unions in organising non-union workplaces. 
The fact that unions appear to have been powerless to prevent the widespread 
abandonment of collective bargaining in private sector workplaces in the 1990s does 
not bode well for the future. If current trends continue we expect to see little signs of a 
serious revival in union fortunes. Unions are not organising enough non-union 
workplaces to keep pace with losses caused by the closure of existing unionised 
workplaces. Nor are they protecting and sustaining the bargaining arrangements that 
they have in continuing private sector workplaces. 
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Chapter 3 
Unions, Youth and the Incumbency Effect: What’s the Connection? 
Rafael Gomez 
 
Summary 
 
· Union membership is like an ‘experience-good’ in the sense that most union 
benefits (procedural justice, job security, the provision of family-friendly 
policies) are hard to observe ex ante.  
 
· Even if attributes are made visible (through information campaigns) union 
provided benefits are still of indeterminate quality before purchase (i.e., “you 
don’t know how good a union is unt il after you join”) and hence still subject to 
the same experiential properties. 
 
· The indeterminate level of quality associated with union membership 
generates ‘risk’. Joining a union is therefore a decision akin to the purchase of 
a product whose payoff is only fully observed after purchase.  
 
· Experience goods have certain properties that make them hard to ‘market’ to 
potential customers. Unions face the same problems in trying to acquire union 
members. Experience goods, for example, are hard to promote since they rely 
on word-of-mouth and personal referrals rather simple formal advertising 
campaigns.  
 
· Unions need to be aware that the growing proportion of workers who have 
never sampled union membership (never-members) is a major factor 
underlying continued union density decline in Britain. Unions, consequently, 
have to find a way of lowering sampling costs for new workers. Sampling is 
important because we know, by way of the incumbency effect, that early 
exposure to unionisation positively sensitises workers to membership 
throughout their life-course. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Union membership confers certain benefits to workers. Some of these benefits, 
like the union wage premium, are visible to both members and non-members alike. 
Most others, such as the enforcement of procedural justice or the establishment of 
family friendly practices, are hard to identify before entering the labour market and 
near impossible if one has never sampled union membership. It is only when a worker 
has actually been employed in a unionised environment for a long enough duration, 
or, when a worker has access to reliable information about the nature of union 
membership, that s/he can form an accurate opinion about the value of membership 
(i.e. whether the benefits of joining outweigh any of the potential costs). If a worker 
never experiences any of the potential benefits derived from unionisation, they may be 
less inclined to become a due paying member where unions are present and even less 
likely to actively organise in workplaces lacking any union presence. 
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Unions, therefore, have a problem in convincing potential members that what 
they offer is of benefit to them. This is especially the case if, as recent British and 
American research suggests, the largest and most visible benefit (i.e. the wage 
advantage conferred to unionised workers) has largely disappeared.  
 
 
Union ‘voice’ as an experience good 
 
Unions can take solace in the fact that they are not alone in this regard. Any 
firm which provides a product or service with hard-to-observe attributes and which 
derives its revenue stream by selling memberships, has to overcome the twin 
problems of ‘information’ and ‘experience’ hurdles. Take the case of a fitness club 
that sells memberships in order to finance its operations. The fitness club needs to first 
advertise its presence and second it has to convince potential patrons that their 
facilities and staff are better than the competition. Goods and services, such as these -- 
that need to be sampled before purchase in order to discern quality -- are termed 
experience goods. Unionisation can also be conceived of in this way, since it too is a 
service high in experiential attributes.  
 
 
The experiential properties of union ‘voice’ 
 
Apart from the difficulty associated with discerning quality before purchase, 
union membership shares other important experiential properties. An experience good 
tends to be accompanied by substantial switching costs after it has been purchased. 
This makes it ‘durable’ in the sense that an experience good has a long shelf life, as 
compared to a non-durable (like a particular brand of bottled water) that has low 
switching costs and is purchased more frequently. The durable nature of union 
membership can be measured by turnover and job tenure. Union members tend to 
have longer job spells with one employer (higher tenure) than otherwise similar non-
union workers, and unionised firms have lower quit rates (turnover) than non-union 
firms do do.  
 
Another characteristic of experience goods, which is also shared by union 
membership, is that they tend to exhibit higher than average ‘brand loyalty’ and ‘post-
purchase’ levels of satisfaction. If a person has ever been unionised, he or she is more 
likely to remain so when switching jobs as compared to a worker who has never 
sampled membership. Likewise, attitudes towards unionisation are more favourable if 
one has ever-been a member. This is the so-called ‘incumbency effect’ identified by 
Freeman and Diamond, and it remains significant even when one controls for sets of 
attributes which remain fixed for some time (occupational status) and which could 
(positively or negatively) bias attitudes towards unions. 
 
 
Unions, experience and informational asymmetries 
 
The incumbency effect described above corresponds to yet another feature of 
union membership, which is also a hallmark of experience goods. This feature relates 
to the economics of information and search -- a stream of research originating forty 
years ago, but which has rarely (if ever) been applied to the study of union 
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membership. The economics of information demonstrates that knowledge about the 
potential benefits of an experience good is optimally (and hence most often) 
disseminated via informal networks like personal recommendations, rather than 
through formal advertising channels. This is because ‘trust’ is highly correlated with 
‘reputation’ and a personal referral is akin to someone staking his or her ‘reputation’ 
on the product endorsement in question. Thus, when quality is hard to observe, 
personal recommendations become the preferred channel by which potential 
customers are informed about hard-to-observe product attributes. A mechanic, for 
example, does not generally advertise on television. Indeed, we tend to be suspicious 
of any mechanic who does. Instead, the mechanic generates his customer base through 
personal referrals, or, more generally by ‘word of mouth’. 
 
The informational asymmetries generated by the experiential characteristics of 
a personal service are replicated in the union case if we note the strong inter-
generational transmission of union status observed in longitudinal data. Machin and 
Blanden find that sons and daughters of union workers are 20% more likely than 
comparable individuals to become union members. This is independent of occupation, 
region, and industry.  
 
Similarly, Gomez, Gunderson and Meltz find that having a social environment 
consisting of friends and relatives who support unionisation makes the probability of 
desiring unionisation higher than those lacking in such social connections. This effect 
is even larger when youths and adults are separated into sub-samples and analysed 
(i.e., the positive effect of a social circle that is familiar and/or supportive of 
unionisation is twice as large for those with less labour market experience than it is 
for the old). Older workers -- in keeping with the experiential properties of union 
membership -- rely on their own sampling history to form opinions about 
unionisation, whereas young workers with less labour market experience rely more 
heavily on social networks and personal referrals (see table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1: Social Networks and Preferences for Unionisation 
  
Dependent Variable: Desire for Unionisation 
 
Independent ‘Network’ Variables 
Youth  
(aged 15-24) 
% 
Adults 
(aged 25-65) 
% 
?  
Youth-Adult 
% 
Union family member 37 
 
11 +26 
Positive peer attitudes towards unions 41 
 
29 +12 
Source: Gomez, Gunderson and Meltz (2002: Table 4). Numbers represent percentage point increases 
in the desire for unionisation controlling for standard demographic and other variables. 
 
Charlwood’s finding that the socio-economic characteristics of an area in which an 
individual lives predicts willingness to join a union, is also congruent with the 
experiential framework. Informal networks and social capital are likely to vary 
systematically with socio-economic environment. One only has to consider the 
different beliefs and values that are transmitted through membership in a working 
men’s club compared to that of a golf club, to understand how important these social 
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networks can be in the generation of attitudes and behaviours favourable (or 
unfavourable) to unions. 
 
 
Rising ‘never-membership’ in Britain: Is the downward spiral inevitable? 
 
The results discussed above speak finally to the two channels by which people 
become informed about the benefits (and costs) of unionisation and with experience 
goods more generally. Essentially, sampling and information gathering through 
personal referrals are the two most prevalent ways that potential members (workers) 
form favourable or unfavourable opinions about union voice, or make decisions about 
whether to pursue membership or not.  
 
As we have seen, union members tend to be ‘brand- loyal’ in the sense that 
those who sample union membership stick with it. The problem for the union 
movement in the United States and Britain in particular, is the lack of ‘sampling’ on 
the part of new labour market entrants (i.e., the young). This problem is particularly 
acute as ‘never-membership’ -- as opposed to ex-membership i.e., those who have 
abandoned membership -- accounts for the bulk of the decline in union density in 
Britain in the eighties and nineties. This finding applies to membership decline in both 
recognised and non-recognised workplaces.   
 
The problem of never-membership resides with the voluntary nature of due-
payments in Britain (which owes its origin to EU law which prohibits agency shop 
arrangements). In an open-shop system the default option for employees is set to 
‘non-union’ even within recognised workplaces. New workers, therefore, are less 
likely to pay dues unless actively compelled to do so. This is so for three reasons. 
First, because new workers enter a workplace as non-members, they face switching 
costs engendered by moving out of their non-due-paying status into a union fee-
paying job. We know, from the work of Mathew Rabin and others, that these costs 
need not be large (the cost of filling out a form could be enough) to induce 
procrastination and persistence in non-union status. Second, as new workers, they 
have yet to observe the quality of union membership. Over time, workers gain greater 
labour market experience such that the quality of union representation becomes fully 
revealed. The longer a person works, for example, the more apparent becomes the 
need for job protection. As a worker matures, union membership loses its experiential 
properties and if the experience of union recognition at work is a positive one, the 
chances of joining a union should also increase. Finally, the cost of switching 
employers increases as workers mature, thereby raising the need for voice provision. 
Employees are therefore more likely to be in need of union provided benefits (such as 
job security) as they age. All three effects (the non-union default option for new 
workers; the revelation of union quality; and the increasing need for voice) predict 
that older workers are more likely to join a union than younger workers, even within 
recognised workplaces.  
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This prediction holds true (at least in Britain). Bryson and Gomez have found 
that the fall in union density within the recognised sector since 1982 is due mostly to 
young workers who have stopped purchasing membership. In more precise terms, the 
proportion of those aged 30 + who are union members within recognised workplaces 
remained virtually unchanged throughout the eighties and nineties (0.72 in 1983 to 
0.69 in 1998) but the unionisation rate amongst 18-25 year olds plunged from 0.67 to 
0.41 between 1982 and 1998 respectively. 
 
 
How does the transmission of union status and preferences occur? 
 
Although little is known from an economic perspective about the specific 
micro- level processes that make the intergenerational transmission of preferences and 
union status possible, there is a literature in social psychology that has tried to 
understand such behaviour and preference formation and it has been applied to the 
unionisation literature by Gomez, Gunderson and Meltz. 
 
The attribution theory of behaviour argues that instead of conceiving of 
individuals as utility maximisers, with a taste for unionisation that is fixed, individuals 
can be viewed as developing and forming conceptions of the ‘self’. This self-concept 
is dynamic and is changing over time. The feedback loop involved can proceed in a 
number of ways. The elements involved are actions, attributions and roles which 
define a self-concept. In the classic (rational) case, individuals have defined roles and 
a clearly formed self-concept, which leads to certain actions that, in turn, lead to 
certain attributions that ultimately reinforce the original self-concept.  
 
Translating this process to the case of a potential union member with some 
knowledge of unionisation’s benefits, we can see how a person who prefers 
unionisation (i.e. a self-concept which is positive about unions) would attempt to find 
a job in a unionised environment. Assuming that he or she does find unionised 
employment, we know by way of the incumbency effect that they are more likely to 
develop positive opinions (i.e. positive attributions about unionisation) about that 
work environment. Moreover, these attributions will be independent of any original 
self-selection into the unionised job. The effect of this initial exposure will persist 
throughout the course of one’s career and make it more likely that the individual will 
find another unionised job or remain a union member. Even if he or she does not 
remain unionised, their favourable opinions may influence a sibling, friend, or co-
worker to join a union where one is present. 
 
The social-psychological model can be adapted to the case of workers with 
less well-defined self-concepts (i.e. workers who do not know whether unionisation is 
beneficial to them). People with malleable opinions about unionisation tend to be 
those with less labour market experience such as the young or newly arrived 
immigrants. So where does their feedback loop begin?  
 
In general, the social environment is the strongest predictor of whether a 
worker has a positive or negative view of unionisation. In particular, and as noted 
earlier, parental union status imparts a 20% boost on a sibling’s likelihood of 
becoming a union member later in life.  
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This initial exposure leads to the undertaking of certain actions -- such as 
applying for a unionised job or helping out in an organising campaign -- that, in turn, 
lead to the formation of attributions (i.e. “I apply for unionisation therefore I am 
favourably disposed to unions”). Attributions feed into the formative stage of self-
concept formation. Over time, the self-concept becomes more firmly entrenched and 
less susceptible to alteration. This is why social networks affect older workers much 
less strongly, since they are more reliant on their own individual ‘sampling’ history in 
forming opinions about unionisation (see figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: The socialization process of a young worker* 
(3) attributions 
 
 
(4) self-concept                                                                                          (2) actions 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) social network 
 
 
*The feedback loop applies to workers with less labour market experience (Montgomery 1999). 
 
 
What use can unions make of these findings? 
 
Clearly, unions cannot replace the social networks that give rise to the inter-
generational transmission of union status, but they can replicate some of the same 
processes. While this may sound difficult and near impossible to achieve, in this 
respect once gain, the union movement’s task is not unique. If unions simply translate 
the need to capture market share (union membership as a percentage of total workers) 
from a product-market setting to the labour market, they can perhaps achieve the same 
success that many firms have in acquiring a loyal customer base. 
 
Unions that are unable to organise the young are nevertheless capable of 
influencing the formation of a self-concept that is favourable to unionisation -- such as 
initial exposure to unions through an expansion of existing paid summer internships in 
organising academies and union head offices. Positive initial exposures are the 
mechanisms that make young people who come from non-union households more 
likely to become members later on in life. 
 
Replicating the process by which the inter-generational transmission of a 
‘preferred brand’ occurs is another way -- drawing on what we know of experience 
good promotional techniques -- for unions to gain market share. Early product 
exposure, for example, is one way that youths become lovers of ‘Pepsi’ over ‘Coca-
Cola’. Unions could perhaps try to mould the preferences of youth in a similar way. If 
the union movement were to somehow sponsor parts of the school curriculum (as 
Pearson Education and Microsoft who now sponsor textbook purchases and the 
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provision of interactive media in the classroom do) or offer a prominent array of 
university scholarships (as many firms with formerly bad consumer reputations such 
as BP and Shell do), then perhaps a whole new generation of youth would be 
sensitised to unions throughout their life-course.  
 
Unions and trade union congresses around the world that are employing 
successful recruitment techniques are generally those that have (at least implicitly) 
understood the experiential nature of union membership. The case of the Norwegian 
Union of Graphical Workers (Norsk Grafisk Forbund, NGF) is illustrative of this new 
marketing approach. In January 2002, NGF launched a 'digital trade union' concept - a 
trial project aimed at attracting new groups of employees by means of ICT, among 
them the increasing number of young non-unionised employees within the ICT sector 
in Norway. It was meant to act as an alternative trade union organisation for 
employees in the ICT sector and to lower the sampling costs of union services for a 
segment of workers who had historically bypassed union membership. The new union 
is accessible only via the Internet, which means that it has no shop stewards and does 
not run traditional union meetings. Nevertheless, NGF supplies its services 24 hours a 
day 7 days a week to all its internet based members. In the one year since its 
inception, membership among ICT workers grew by almost 10%, even as the ICT 
sector was losing jobs.  
 
The Internet allows unions to lower membership sampling costs and to reduce 
the perceived risk of joining a union for new labour market entrants. The Internet also 
permits unions to by-pass the workplace altogether and distribute their services 
directly to employees. This is the direct or relationship marketing method that has 
been used by many start-up companies, such as low cost airlines EasyJet and 
RyanAir, with great success. Such companies offer their services via the Internet at a 
lower cost than if they would have distributed their services through a retailer or 
vendor. Even following September 11th, as major airlines like United and Swissair 
declared bankruptcy, internet-based airlines generated some of their largest profits 
ever. Freeman and Rogers have recently coined the term open-source unionism to 
describe similar, though more nascent, attempts by unions to target their services 
directly to prospective employees. The TUC recently (May 2001) held a one-day 
conference on the effect of the Internet on unionisation, indicating that the message of 
direct marketing is slowly diffusing to the union sector in Britain. 
 
Ultimately, a full listing of optimal recruitment practices based on the lessons 
gained in experience good markets, requires more research. Nevertheless, making 
unions aware that they are ‘selling a service that is high in experiential attributes’ is 
perhaps the first step in a long process of rejuvenation that may transform unionised 
workplaces from hard-to-observe enclaves of beneficial employee voice, to ones that 
are spread over a greater part of the industrial landscape.  
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Chapter 4 
Recognition and Organising 
Sian Moore 
 
Summary 
 
· The statutory recognition procedure is working in terms of the government’s 
own objectives of providing representation where a majority of the workforce 
want it and that encourages the voluntary resolution of recognition claims. The 
prospects for its survival look promising. Yet the number of applications to the 
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) is still limited and the direct impact of 
the procedure in terms of numbers of employees covered is marginal. 
 
· There are important qualifications to its success. The design of the procedure 
and the exercise of discretion by the CAC mean that there are opportunities for 
employers to defeat applications even where there is clear majority support for 
a union on application – union membership is fragile in the face of employer 
hostility. 
 
· It is suggested that recognitions through the statutory process represent less 
than one in ten of new recognitions. The increase in voluntary recognition 
agreements in the shadow of the law indicates that the statutory procedure has 
been a stimulant of union activity in terms of recruitment and organising. Yet 
the scale of the task facing unions in reversing membership decline remains 
great. 
 
 
Issues 
 
Labour’s declared aim in introducing a statutory recognition procedure was 
not to explicitly promote collective bargaining, but to provide a right to recognition 
where a majority of the relevant workforce wants it. The government continually 
emphasised that the nature of relationships between employers and employees should 
be voluntary and that a statutory route to recognition should be used only as a last 
resort. Fairness at Work aimed to promote a new culture of co-operation between 
employers and employees. 
 
Statutory support for union representation fulfilled a commitment to the 
unions made by the Labour Party prior to government. Unions had campaigned for a 
statutory right to recognition from the 1980s as a response to the decline in both 
membership and collective bargaining coverage and, in some sectors, to 
derecognition. In the 1990s this campaign was accompanied by the revival of 
recruitment and organising as a key focus of the union movement, essential in order to 
address two decades of membership loss. This organising agenda ran parallel to the 
TUC’s commitment to Social Partnership suggesting that that union survival is  
simultaneously perceived as largely based upon non-conflictual relationships with 
employers. 
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Aims of the research 
 
The area of recognition and organisation brings together research on a number 
of potential factors influencing union growth – including the legal climate, employer 
behaviour and the role of union organising and activism. The recognition project 
evaluates how far the statutory recognition procedure is meeting the government’s 
stated objectives and whether its legal design is proving to be more robust than its 
predecessors. Yet the government’s emphasis on the voluntary route requires that the 
investigation moves beyond a narrow focus on the legal machinery towards an 
assessment of the role of the law in the area of industrial relations. We ident ify the 
factors influencing whether or not cases take the statutory route. We also aim to 
examine the assumption that cases that go through the statutory procedure are more 
likely to result in narrower collective bargaining and less likely to result in 
‘partnership’ agreements than those concluded voluntarily. How far is the legislation 
encouraging a renegotiation of industrial relations and the kind of ‘partnership’ 
relationships advocated by the White Paper? The work on recognition dovetails with 
that on partnership, with the former focusing on a possible process by which 
partnership is achieved and the distinctiveness of such agreements and the latter on 
the meaning and outcomes of partnership for the parties involved. 
 
We consider the impact of the law on employers and how far UK employers 
will frustrate union attempts to secure recognition in the way that US employers have 
done (and how far the legislation allows this) or how far statutory support for unions 
gives them a new legitimacy in the eyes of employers, encouraging them to concede 
recognition and in what circumstances. 
 
A related matter is the extent to which the legislation supports union 
recruitment and organising efforts, enabling them to significantly increase the returns 
on investment. Our study of organising campaigns analyses the factors that activate 
frustrated demand for unions and the role played by union activists in this. It identifies 
the components of both successful and failed campaigns. Research on the aftermath of 
statutory and voluntary recognition cases examines how far membership and 
organisation is sustained following recognition and how far subsequent bargaining 
meets the aspirations and expectations of newly recruited union members.  
 
 
Methods of investigation 
 
Our analysis of statutory recognition is based on three sources: (a) employers, 
(b) trade union officers and (c) the CAC. In (a) the results of a telephone survey of 
400 private sector employers (with 50 or more employees) conducted just after the 
statutory procedure was introduced, is used to explore the scope for unions to achieve 
recognition and employers’ role in this. 
 
In (b) we address the trade union approach to recognition and its manifestation 
in voluntary recognition through two surveys of national unions. The first, centred on 
trade union strategies in relation to recognition and recruitment, was based upon semi-
structured interviews with the general secretary or a senior national officer responsible 
for recognition of 17 TUC-affiliated trade unions between February and August 2000. 
The second survey, more directly concerned with the statutory procedure, was a postal 
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survey of all unions and staff associations listed by the Annual Report of the 
Certification Officer 1999-2000. This will be followed up in 2003 with a similar 
survey asking national unions about their perceptions of the impact of the procedure 
three years after its implementation. A third union survey is based upon 
questionnaires sent to union officers responsible for CAC cases after the case has left 
the CAC system. This survey is ongoing and illuminates union experience of the 
statutory procedure, the background to CAC cases and union perceptions of employer 
behaviour. The relationship between the statutory and voluntary routes to recognition 
will be explored in 2003 through studies of the TGWU, NUJ and GPMU, examining 
the ratio of each union’s statutory to voluntary agreements, employer behaviour in the 
outcome of cases and the content of agreements. 
 
In (c) consideration of the operation of the statutory procedure so far is based 
upon publicly available CAC documentation, the CAC web-site and observations of 
CAC hearings. 
 
The union organising research entails case studies of union organising 
campaigns across various industry sectors including finance, retail, print and 
transport. Organising campaigns to be included in this study vary in their approach 
(characterised as ‘adversarial’ or ‘partnership’), degrees of success (and failure) in 
mobilisation and securing recognition, the type of workforce being organised and the 
industry sector in which the campaigns are being carried out. 
 
Data is being collected through in-depth interviews with union organisers and 
officials, workplace representatives, management representatives and employees 
(union members and non-members) in workplaces being organised. Depending upon 
access and feasibility, a survey of all employees being organised will be undertaken.   
 
 
Findings 
 
After two years we conclude that the statutory recognition procedure is 
working in terms of the government’s objectives, but there are some important 
qualifications to its success. The government’s three main objectives in introducing 
the statutory procedure were: 
· to provide for representation and recognition ‘where a majority of the relevant 
workforce wants it’;  
· to introduce ‘a procedure which will work’;  
· and to ‘encourage the parties to reach voluntary agreements wherever 
possible’.  
 
Representation where the majority want it 
The number of applications to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) has 
not been large – 158 distinct applications in the first two years. However, nearly two 
thirds of the 132 cases that had left the procedure had resulted in recognition or 
discussions on recognition; 40 had been granted recognition through the procedure 
(24 as a result of a ballot) and a further 45 had been withdrawn because the parties 
had agreed to discussions on a voluntary agreement. 
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The success rate of CAC applications suggests that, in line with the 
government’s first objective, in most cases recognition is being granted where the 
majority of the workforce are union members. Yet this objective was limited from the 
outset by aspects of legislative design – an application is not valid if the employer 
employs 20 or fewer workers, while it is inadmissible if there is already a collective 
agreement covering all or some of the bargaining unit, even though the union 
involved may neither be the union of the workers’ choice or independent. 
 
The extent to which the procedure can provide representation is also limited 
by the way the CAC exercises its discretion in three key areas: at the admissibility 
stage when it has to decide whether a majority of the proposed bargaining unit would 
be likely to favour recognition; at the bargaining unit stage when it has to decide 
whether the unions’ proposed bargaining unit meets a number of criteria; and finally 
when it has to decide whether to order a ballot when the union has majority 
membership. 
 
On the first, the judgement as to whether a majority of the bargaining unit are 
likely to support recognition, analysis of CAC decisions show that no case has been 
accepted so far with a membership of lower than 35% without there being other 
convincing evidence about the support for collective bargaining. The CAC has in 
some cases allowed for the difficulty the union has in gaining access to the workforce 
when interpreting this evidence.  
 
On the second area of discretion, the bargaining unit stage, evidence suggests 
that the CAC had supported the union’s proposed bargaining unit or a variant of it in 
71% of cases where it had to make a decision. In the vast majority of cases where the 
employer had challenged the union’s bargaining unit it had proposed an expanded 
bargaining unit by including either more occupations or sites. The CAC had tended to 
resist employers’ arguments to include more occupations where it was demonstrated 
that the terms and conditions of the occupational group proposed were distinct. 
However unions have had more difficulties where the employer has sought to extend 
the bargaining unit to include workers sharing the same distinct terms and conditions 
on all sites in an organisation. In four of the five (of eight) cases where the CAC has 
made such a ruling the union could not subsequently demonstrate sufficient support 
for recognition amongst the workers on the other sites included in the revised 
bargaining unit and the applications have failed. The implication of the CAC rulings 
may be to discourage unions to submit applications for larger multi-site national 
companies. One exception to the CAC rulings was Kwik-Fit, where the employer 
subsequently made a legal challenge to the CAC’s decision to allow a bargaining unit 
based on the London area only, this challenge was rejected on appeal.  
 
The third area of discretion, provision for the CAC to order a ballot where a 
union is judged to have majority membership, was one of the two changes made to 
the proposals for statutory recognition as laid out in the white paper (Fairness at 
Work) and this change was a key disappointment for the TUC. The CAC may order a 
ballot if it is ‘in the interests of good industrial relations’; if it is informed by a 
significant number of union members that they do not wish the union to represent 
them for collective bargaining; or if it has evidence which leads it to doubt that a 
significant number of union members want the union to bargain on their behalf. The 
CAC had ordered a ballot in nine of 27 cases where it was demonstrated that the 
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union, on application, had majority membership. All three criteria have been invoked 
and all three give employers extra opportunity for intervention in the process. In 
addition four ballots have been ordered because at the point at which the decision to 
ballot was made the union no longer had majority membership. This is an area for 
concern since analysis of the procedure shows that majority membership can be very 
fragile, particularly if the case is in the procedure for some time (and delays may be 
provoked by the employer). Union membership in CAC cases is vulnerable to labour 
turnover, redundancies, recruitment into the bargaining unit (possibly as an employer 
tactic) and employer pressure and intimidation. This raises the question of whether 
the membership figure should be fixed at the point when the application is accepted. 
 
Unions lost a third of ballots held in the first two years and this is significant 
given that the cases have already been through the admissibility tests. In particular, in 
a third of ballots union support has been lower than union membership was at the 
outset and our follow-up survey has indicated that this may be explained by employer 
behaviour following the application or during the ballot. Regulation of employer 
behaviour is limited to the ballot period, but even then intimidatory behaviour is 
difficult to prevent. The behaviour of employers in the ballot appears to have a key 
bearing on the result; in a number of cases the employer has been neutral and 
appeared to genuinely want to test majority support for recognition. Yet in at least two 
cases where the ballot was lost an oppositional employer was able to limit the access 
granted to the union during the ballot period; and in at least one other case unions 
have reported that employers redefined the contractual status of employees in order to 
include them in the bargaining unit to be balloted. 
 
A procedure that will work 
So far the CAC has not been restricted by the sort of legal intervention that 
defeated earlier statutory procedures. In the two of four applications for judicial 
reviews that have been heard, the courts have backed rather than undermined the 
CAC’s operation of the procedure. 
 
The encouragement of voluntary agreements 
The statutory procedure should encourage voluntary resolution of disputes and 
be used only as a last resort. Experience of the first two years suggests some success. 
Our union survey suggests that the procedure has been a stimulant to union activity in 
terms of recruitment and organising. There has been a substantial increase in 
voluntary recognition agreements both prior to the introduction of the procedure and 
subsequently. In the year 1999-2000, when the Employment Relations Act was 
enacted, the TUC claim a 300% increase in the number of voluntary agreements 
reached. TUC data identifies 1026 new recognition agreements between 1995 and 
2001, whilst Gall estimates (based on more diverse data sources) that unions have 
secured over 1400 new recognition agreements covering at least 400,000 workers in 
the same period.  
 
Both TUC and ACAS data, show that voluntary agreements are far 
outstripping those emerging from the procedure. During the period November 2000 to 
October 2001, when the TUC recorded 449 full and partial voluntary recognition 
agreements, recognitions entirely and partially through the statutory procedure 
represented under 10% of all new recognitions reported to the TUC (see table 4.1). 
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Similarly during the period June 2000 to December 2001 the CAC received 126 
applications compared to the 608 requests for conciliation over recognition that 
ACAS handled (CAC cases thus represent no more than 21% of all recognition 
disputes which involved a government agency). 
 
 
Table 4.1 
Recognition Agreements November 2000 – October 2001 
 Agreements 
reached by TUC 
unions (%) 
Numbers covered 
by agreements (%) 
Voluntary  443 (91.5) 102,000* (92.9) 
Semi-Statutory   24 (5.0)    4,800 (4.4) 
Statutory   17 (3.5)    2,957 (2.7) 
Total 484 109,757 
 * figures projected from TUC agreements 
 
Source: TUC Trends Surveys (TUC, 2002) and CAC web-site 
 
In terms of numbers of workers covered, data for the period covered by the 
TUC survey (November 2000 to October 2001), table 1 shows that voluntary 
agreements completely outside of the procedure accounted for over 90% (92.9%) of 
numbers covered by all new recognition agreements. Statutory agreements 
represented only 3% of all workers covered, with semi-statutory agreements covering 
a further 4%. 
 
The high ratio of voluntary to statutory agreements also reflects the unions’ 
careful management of their use of the statutory procedure. The majority of unions 
that we surveyed in early 2001 reported that they would in the first instance aim to 
achieve voluntary recognition. In addition, unions were concerned that cases 
submitted to the CAC should not be lost, so they aimed to submit cases that they were 
confident would secure automatic recognition or win a ballot. Centralised internal 
procedures were established in the majority of unions to control the flow of cases to 
the CAC and most TUC-affiliated unions allowed the TUC an advisory role in the 
submission of applications.   
 
The limited number of CAC applications also reflects the design of the 
statutory procedure, which has prescribed which cases are likely to be accepted and to 
meet the thresholds required for recognition. At the same time, following two decades 
of union decline, when the procedure came on stream there were very few ready-made 
cases that could be submitted to the CAC. Our survey of private sector workplaces 
showed that although there were many workplaces (90%) with either no union 
recognition or groups of workers not covered by recognition for collective bargaining, 
in only just under a third of these workplaces were there any union members and in 
fewer than a tenth was there 10% or more union membership – the minimum required 
for acceptance by the CAC. Only a tiny minority of these had more than 50% 
membership, or anything like the sort of level that the CAC would require to 
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demonstrate majority support for recognition. This placed the onus on unions to 
recruit and organise in order to be in a position to exploit the opportunities provided 
by the legislation. 
 
Employers have sought to pre-empt recognition through the provision of non-
union employee voice mechanisms or by approaching a union of their choice in order 
to exclude another, less desirable, union. Our union survey found that in the period 
prior to the legislation unions had received approaches from employers for 
recognition, whilst unions themselves approach employers for recognition, possibly 
on the basis of a more co-operative relationship or ‘partnership’, even though they 
have no or few members. Our employer survey showed that employers may concede 
recognition in the face of majority membership or to exclude a particular union. And 
mirroring the legislation, employers were testing majority membership and conceding 
recognition through voluntary ballots, or when membership reached over 50%.  For 
example, the newspaper publishing company, Newsquest, held a number of voluntary 
recognition ballots at different titles within the company producing a series of 
voluntary recognition agreements with the NUJ. 
 
The increase in voluntary recognition agreements suggests that favourable 
public policy towards unions may influence workers’ willingness to join unions, as 
well as employer attitudes and union strategies. The specific political and social 
context in which workers decide to join unions is important. Yet our research shows 
that unions cannot normally rely on employers to concede recognition and although in 
some cases recognition will be based on existing membership in the workplace, there 
is an absence of ready-made recognition cases that could be submitted to the CAC. 
This means that unions will have to substantially intensify their recruitment and 
organising efforts if they are to significantly extend union recognition, either through 
the legislation or under the threat of its use. Our union survey demonstrates those 
unions for which securing recognition is a priority are also taking a more systematic 
approach to recruitment and organising. The organising project has found that 
workers are more likely to be favourable to union representation if union activists 
encourage their participation in their mobilisation efforts, whilst the way unions frame 
issues of collective injustice is important in encouraging workers to unionise.  
 
 
Implications for future of unions  
 
The prospects for the survival of this third statutory recognition procedure 
look promising. But the implication of our research on the procedure’s first two years 
is that its direct effects are likely to be marginal. In this period only 10,567 workers 
were covered by recognition orders through the procedure, with an estimated 8000 
covered by agreements reached in the semi-statutory cases withdrawn from the 
procedure.  Its shadow effect, the signing of voluntary agreements, is greater. This 
suggests that the statutory route can, paradoxically, support or even enhance what 
remains of the “voluntary” tradition of UK industrial relations. Yet, the scale of the 
task facing unions in reversing membership decline remains great. Regardless of 
employer opposition it involves their organising well beyond conventional terrains. 
Yet so far new recognitions are confined to sectors where unions have historically 
been strong.  It is questionable how far effective organising, ultimately dependent 
upon union resources, will be able to address differential employment growth in the 
traditionally non-union sector. 
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Chapter 5 
Information, Consultation, and Negotiation 
Howard Gospel 
Summary 
 
· An important decision for unions, affecting members and non-members, is 
whether they should further accept multiple-channel representation at work, 
involving joint consultation and information sharing. 
 
· Unions can make employers put into place more effective forms of joint 
consultation and information sharing, to the benefit of employing 
organisations. 
 
· The future of unions in modern Britain will entail coming to terms with new 
forms of voice and providing support for changed forms of workplace 
representation. 
 
Issues  
 
Over the last twenty years, there have been major changes in the form and 
content of employee representation, consultation, and negotiation in Britain. Three 
developments are of particular significance.   
 
First, on almost all indicators, there has been a significant decline in union-
based representation – union members as a proportion of the workforce, the presence 
of union members in a workplace, recognition by employers, the number of 
workplaces with union representatives, and the coverage and scope of collective 
bargaining. These have fallen to particularly low levels in the private sector.   
 
Second, there has been a striking increase in direct forms of employee 
representation via briefing groups, problem-solving circles, and direct workforce 
meetings. These are entirely introduced by management. 
 
Third, forms of indirect representation via information sharing and joint 
consultation, either with or without unions, have held up considerably better than 
arrangements based exclusively on collective bargaining by unions. Our focus is on 
this third area and on how Britain may be moving away from a negotiation-based and 
towards a more information- and consultation-based system of employee 
representation. 
 
The questions which we consider are as follows. What did British workers 
traditionally get by way of representation? Certainly trade unions tried to insist 
exclusively on union-only representation. What do workers in other countries get? 
Certainly, there are more rights for European workers in terms of information and 
consultation. What influence has the European tradition had on British law and 
practice? What do British workers actually want – more union or non-union 
representation? What forms of representation might be ‘in the best interests’ of 
workers, unions, and managements? And what are British workers likely to get in the 
future by way of the mix between information, consultation, and negotiation? 
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The passage of the EU Directive on Information and Consultation rights in 
national level undertakings and its coming transposition into UK law provides threats 
and opportunities for employers and unions. These are highlighted by the Green Paper 
High Performance Workplaces: The Role of Employee Involvement in a Modern 
Economy (July 2002). The CEP team involved in this area have presented evidence as 
part of the green paper consultation process. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Freeman and Diamond have conducted a large survey of 1,300 workers in the 
UK, asking a series of questions about employees and their jobs, problems at work 
and attitudes to management, and preferences for various ways of dealing with 
workplace problems. Gospel and Willman have explored how the law has developed 
in the area of employee representation and its interaction with information and 
consultation. This has involved an analysis of the use of information and consultation 
as part of collective bargaining and a charting of the growth of issue-specific 
consultation in the UK. Further Gospel and Willman have looked comparatively at 
what workers in two other leading European economies, Germany and France, have 
by way of information and consultation rights. Along with Gray and Peccei, they have 
begun an analysis of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey, investigating 
what effect information-sharing has on industrial relations and economic outcomes. 
 
Table 5.1 
Union presence, density, and recognition, collective bargaining, and joint 
consultative arrangements, 1980 to 1998 
 
 
 1980 1984 1990 1998 
Collective bargaining, as predominant form of pay determination – by workplace 
 
All - 60 42 29 
Private 
manufacturing - 50 33 23 
Private services - 36 29 14 
 
Consultation – incidence of joint consultative committee – by workplace 
 
All – any 
consultative 
committee 
34 34 29 29 
Private 26 24 18 26 
Union 
recognition 37 36 34 30 
No recognition 17 20 17 18 
All – any 
functioning 
consultative 
committee 
30 31 26 23 
Source. Adapted from Millward et al. (2000), pp. 85-87, 96, 109, 186-191, 197 
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Findings 
 
Freeman and Diamond show that, among British workers, there is an 
overwhelming desire for collective rather than individual solutions to workplace 
problems and for greater voice in decision-making at work. However, worryingly for 
unions, workers do not rank unions high as the instrument of collective voice. Given a 
choice between unions, works councils, or nothing, only one in ten union members 
prefer a union on its own, whereas three quarters prefer a workplace with both unions 
and works councils. Non-union members are more polarised: one third want no 
workplace organisation at all, about a third want a works council, slightly less want 
both a works council and a union, but only 5% want a union on its own. Further 
analysis of this survey by Gospel and Willman suggests unions and works councils 
are seen as complementary by both non-members and members, especially in 
situations where such dual channel representation already exists. 
 
Table 5.2 
Do you think your workplace would be better with…?  Percentage 
 
 
Do you think your 
workplace would 
be better with… 
 
 
All  
employees  
 
Union  
membership  
status  
 
 
Only  
workplace 
with union  
presence  
Only  
Workplaces  
with  
recognised  
unions 
Only 
workplaces 
with  
WC or JCC 
Both 
WC/JCC  
and union 
presence at 
workplace 
Neither  
WC / JCC  
or union 
presence at 
workplace 
   Member  Non- 
 member 
     
         
Trade Union on its 
own 
 7 11  5 14 16 2 9 6 
Works Council on 
its own 
 21 6  29 11 10 40 9 27 
Works Council 
and Trade Union 
 44 74  27 60 63 24 72 20 
Neither  24 5  34 11 8 31 9 43 
Don't Know  4 3  5 3 3 3 2 4 
         
 
Source: BWRPS (2001), Q51. 
 
On the law, Gospel and Willman conclude that the present UK situation with 
regards to representation at work is inadequate and confusing, with different pieces of 
legislation mandating different representatives and conferring different rights in an ad 
hoc fashion. This reflects how and when the law has developed: historically there was 
support only for trade unions and collective bargaining; slowly, in large part as a 
result of EU influence, information and consultation rights have been given to 
representatives who may or may not be union members; to this have been added rights 
for the whole workforce, as with European Works Council; and now, more important, 
there is the prospect of National Works Councils. To date, in areas such as 
redundancies and changes in ownership, these rights have been issue-specific rather 
than general rights to information and consultation. These new developments create 
significant challenges but also real opportunities for unions. 
 
The analysis of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey has begun 
with a focus on the provision of information. Here, in terms of outcomes, information- 
sharing seems to have a significant positive effect on the quality of the goods or 
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services produced by the organisation. It also has a positive effect on employee 
commitment to the organisation which, in turn, is positively related to labour 
productivity. However, this pattern of direct and indirect benefits is more pronounced 
in non-union than in unionised situations. Information disclosure tends, on the whole, 
to have a stronger positive effect on organisational outcomes in unionised than in non-
unionised settings. 
 
The effects of information-sharing also seem to vary depending on the type of 
information that is disclosed to employees. The systematic sharing of company targets 
relating to various aspects of the operation of the organisation, for example, as well as 
the provision of feedback on the achievement of targets, has a generally positive 
direct and indirect effect on organisational performance. In contrast, the provision of 
general information relating, for example, to the overall performance of the 
organisation, has little or no impact either on employee commitment or on 
organisational outcomes (labour productivity and quality of products/services).  
 
Further analysis will investigate the antecedents of information-sharing 
focusing, in particular, on the organisational, structural and institutional conditions 
that contribute to the development of information-sharing within organisations. It may 
also investigate how negotiation, consultation, information, and direct participation 
interact with one another. In particular, do they conflict or complement one another 
and which performs best in terms of outcomes? 
 
The comparative work on legal aspects of information and consultation in the 
UK, Germany, and France suggests the following. Despite changes in UK law flowing 
from EU membership, both German and French workers have more legal rights than 
their British counterparts. This was seen clearly in the case of the recent restructuring 
of the steel company Corus, when Iron & Steel Trades Confederation members in the 
UK received less information and consultation than their counterparts in Holland. The 
case of Germany provides some optimistic lessons for UK unions: the law on 
information and consultation seems to interact positively with collective bargaining 
and give unions legitimacy. However, the French story is rather more pessimistic: in 
that country information and consultation rights have often substituted for unions. 
 
There are therefore challenges and opportunities for unions as Britain goes 
further down the road towards a system of representation which is more consultation- 
rather than negotiation-based. 
 
 
Future 
 
The passage of the EU Directive on Information and Consultation promises 
major changes in the British system of employee representation in the form of 
national works councils. For the first time, it will establish permanent and general 
arrangements for information and consultation for all workers in the UK, in 
organisations employing more than 50 employees. It will cover three quarters of the 
British labour force. In the light of the Directive, the opportunity for government is to 
establish for the first time in the UK an effective and lasting system of information 
and consultation at work. Some employers may see this as an opportunity to create 
weak voice mechanisms; for others, it may constitute an opportunity to institute 
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stronger arrangements which may complement other aspects of human resource 
management. The challenge for unions is to build on these schemes and to maintain 
and expand their role within them. The evidence would seem to be that a union 
presence complements these arrangements and makes them more effective. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The projects under this heading deal with the central questions of the programme.  
 
· What can unions do for both union- and non-union employees? One possible 
answer (still somewhat controversial in the union movement) would seem to 
be that they can further accept multiple-channel representation and learn now 
to use it. This involves the difficult issues of working with non-union 
representatives, sitting on mixed committees, and even accepting wholly non-
union councils. 
 
· What can unions do for employers? One danger is that employers may seek to 
put in place ‘soft’ forms of representation. There is evidence that suggests that 
these will not have much credibility and will not be very effective. One role 
for unions is to ensure that such forms of representation are strong and 
therefore more acceptable to employees and in the long-run more likely to 
work. 
 
· How can unions adapt and change internally to meet these changing 
circumstances? Arguably unions have a choice as to whether or not they go 
further down the road of multiple-channel representation. If they do, they must 
then show they can develop new advisory roles and meet the demands of new 
workplace representatives. 
 
· Finally, the big question: Have unions a future in modern Britain? This theme 
suggests that one aspect of their future will entail coming to terms with new 
forms of voice and providing support for changed structures of workplace 
representation. 
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Chapter 6 
Partnership, Organising Campaigns and Unions’ Use of the Internet 
Vidu Badigannavar 
 
Issues 
 
These projects focus on unions internal responses to the challenges they face. 
The issues being investigated are: 
 
Partnership project 
· What are the industrial relations and economic outcomes of social partnership 
for workers, unions and employers? 
· Does partnership provide greater opportunity for workers to influence 
workplace level decisions? 
· Does partnership provide greater opportunity for unions or staff associations to 
influence workplace and policy level decisions? 
 
Union organising campaigns 
· How do organising methods and tactics influence: the sense of collective 
injustice, worker identification with union, attribution of blame for worker’s 
problems, worker mobilisation and participation in collective actions? 
· Why do some workers join unions during the course of the organising 
campaigns while others do not? 
· What are the main positive and negative influences on union organising? 
 
Unions and the internet 
· What promise does the internet hold for employee organisation? 
· What changes will unions have to bring about in their internal organisation in 
order to reinvent themselves in the 21st Century? 
 
 
Methods of investigation 
 
For the social partnership and union organising projects, we are using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. The partnership research uses matched cases of 
firms with and without social partnership agreements. The project is implemented in 
two stages. The first stage involves a survey of employees, workplace employee 
representatives and line managers. The survey data is analysed and presented back to 
the unions and managements of the participating firms. The second stage involves 
interviews with workplace employee reps and full time union officers, line and senior 
managers and groups of employees. The interview data supplements the analysis of 
the survey data. Currently the sectors represented in the partnership research are: 
retail, banking and finance, health, local government, ports and docks. Access is being 
negotiated in the manufacturing sector. 
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The research on union organising campaigns examines selected case studies of 
union organising across various industry sectors with varying degrees of organising 
success. Data is being collected primarily through in-depth interviews with full-time 
union officers, union activists, union members, non-members, managers and wherever 
possible through surveys of workers being organised, union organisers and activists. 
Organising campaigns in the print and media/IT, distribution, banking and finance, 
call centres, ports and, the higher education sector have been currently included in the 
research project. Both partnership and organising research involve extensive review of 
union and management records such as minutes of meetings, union campaign 
materials etc. In order to get a broader picture within industry sectors, we are also 
comparing the findings of both research projects with selected findings from the 
British Workplace Representation and Participation Survey. 
 
The BWRPS provides data from a representative sample of 1300 workers 
across the UK workforce. Data for the Unions and the Internet project is derived from 
this survey, carried out between June-July 2001. Data was collected and recorded 
through face-to-face interviews with respondents. Findings of the BWRPS have been 
compared with those from a similar survey (What Workers Want) conducted in the 
USA by Freeman and Rogers in 1999. 
 
 
Major findings 
 
Social Partnership 
· A survey of a medium size retail firm ‘Big Deal Co’ (700 workers, 30% 
response rate) voted as one of the best cases of non-union partnership by the 
Involvement and Participation Association of UK revealed that: 80% of 
managers and 68% of the staff perceived the Staff Committee – the main 
channel of collective representation and employee voice – to have ‘little/no 
influence’ on changes in pay systems, working hours, staff deployment, and 
negotiating redundancy pay. 
 
· Compared with a representative sample of the UK workforce (BWRPS 2001) 
from the retail and wholesale sector, workers in Big Deal Co were 
significantly disadvantaged in setting their working hours including breaks, 
overtime, time-off, and deciding their own pay or the level of pay rise people 
in their department should get. However, Big Deal Co workers enjoyed more 
freedom in organising their work and displayed greater trust in management as 
compared to the workers from the BWRPS sample (see table 6.1). 
 
· Workers who received a great deal of information from management about 
key employment-related issues, were more likely to see management’s 
decisions as fair and more likely to report higher levels of trust in 
management. However, when workers perceived that they did not receive 
adequate information, they were more likely to agree that joining a trade union 
would give them a better chance of securing a voice at their workplace. 
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Table 6.1 
Comparative findings from employee survey in Big Deal Co with those of retail and wholesale sector employees in the British Workplace 
Representation and Participation Survey [BWRPS 2001] - percent 
 
 
BWRPS    Big Deal Co. 
Lot/Some Little/None   Lot/Some Little/None  
 
Trust:       78  21   88  12   
 
Employment security     83  17   86  14  
 
 
Deciding how to do your job and organise work:  72  28   82  18 
 
Pace at which you work:     74  26   75  25 
 
Setting working hours including breaks, overtime 
And time off*:      52  42   37  63 
 
Deciding the level of pay rise people in your dept:  13  87   2  98 
Should get*  
 
PROBLEM AT WORK     YES  NO   YES  NO 
                
Pay (unfair wages in BWRPS):    19  81   64  35 
 
 
Notes and sources: *Compared to similar variables in Big Deal Co employee survey. 
BWRPS: ‘British Workplace Representation and Participation Survey’ by Diamond, W. and Freeman, R. (2001) 
Big Deal Co.: Case study company for social partnership research.  
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· Workers who perceived that they had access to job specific as well as generic 
training that would enable them to secure alternative employment if they were 
to lose their current jobs, were also likely to demonstrate higher levels of trust, 
psychological contract and commitment towards their organisation. 
 
Union organising campaigns 
· A survey of 130 university contract researchers (response rate 35%) was 
undertaken in July 2002. These workers are being currently organised by a 
union in the higher education sector. The key issues of concern among the 
contract researchers were employment security and pay. The union has 
achieved significant success in addressing these issues in some other 
universities including transfers to open-ended contracts. However, less than a 
fifth of respondents were aware of the union’s achievements. As a result, 50% 
said that they were unlikely to join the union because the ‘union does not 
achieve anything’. High membership fees also figured as one of the most 
important reasons why workers were unlikely to join the union. This provides 
an opportunity for the union to improve upon its communication channels and 
reconsider its market pricing as levers in the organising campaign. 
 
· It was found that workers, who blamed the management for their problems, 
were less likely to perceive their management’s decisions to be fair, they were 
more likely to perceive they could have a better voice if more people joined a 
trade union and were more likely to participate in collective actions. 
 
· Workers who reported that their workplace representative encouraged and 
facilitated their involvement in decisions affecting employees at their 
workplace also agreed that participating in collective activities is likely to 
provide them with a better voice at their workplace. This reinforces the 
importance of encouraging rank-and-file participation in organising 
campaigns. 
 
Unions and the internet  
· Findings suggest that the low cost of information, communication and 
interaction on the Web offers trade unions opportunities to provide improved 
services and attract new members particularly in the private sector, which 
offers the greatest challenge to trade union density in UK and USA. The 
research offers a new proposal for revival of unions – the ‘Open Source 
Unionism’. Traditionally, unions have targeted their efforts on securing 
majority support of workers in organisations with small membership density 
where there were fewer chances of getting employer recognition for collective 
bargaining. This was primarily due to the disproportionately high cost 
involved in servicing a small group of members. The Internet has changed this 
cost equation. At a virtually zero marginal cost, unions can provide in many 
instances paid-for services to individuals in non-union workplaces, including 
membership at a reduced rate. This way, workers can develop long-term 
association with the labour movement irrespective of job changes during the 
course of their careers. Unions will have to adapt their internal organisation to 
accommodate all types of workers and should not restrict themselves to 
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specific skill types. Servicing through the Internet will necessarily have to be 
complemented with the presence of real union activists and union 
infrastructure such as the trade councils in UK, to promote organising and 
address individual member needs.  
 
· The potential membership gains are likely to be substantial. In the USA for 
instance, NLRB data indicates that in the private sector, approximately twice 
as many workers are past union members as present ones. These former 
members are modestly more inclined than other non-union workers to say that 
they would “vote union tomorrow” if given a chance, and close to 40% report 
their past experience with unions as “very good” or “good”. If just one of the 
ten workers who say they would “vote a union tomorrow” joined, it would 
increase union density by a third. If just one in ten of the workers who have 
been unionised in the past and reported it as “good or very good” experience 
joined again, membership would increase by 7%. Current organising efforts 
are unlikely to result in sustained membership gains and union density in the 
private sector in USA is likely to decline and stabilise somewhere around 4-
5%. 
 
· In the UK, unions have used the Internet to attract new members and, to 
strengthen shop steward structures. For instance, the Association of University 
Teachers (AUT of UK) has used email in its campaign to organise fixed term 
academic staff. The TUC and some individual unions like the UK Building 
Workers Union (UCATT) have developed periodic e-bulletins aimed to keep 
safety reps and others informed about the health and safety news. 
 
· The Web has been found to facilitate greater democracy within unions, 
including enhancing the ability of dissident groups to make their case to the 
members. In November 2000, the UK’s CWU held an Internet ballot over 
accepting a collective bargaining agreement. The turnout was 71%. The 
website, Rogelyons.com is devoted to criticising the General Secretary of the 
erstwhile MSF union Roger Lyons’ expenditure of union money to defend 
himself against charges of financial indiscretion. As of March 2001, it had 
received over 12,000 hits and achieved notoriety throughout the union. 
 
· Findings also suggest that the web has the potential to alter the expression of 
industrial disputes. One such prominent example cited is the June 2000 
takeover of www.nike.com, by web activists or ‘hacktivists’ which directed 
people to a site that protested sweatshops and globilisation; and the February 
2001 hacking of the World Economic forum site that obtained the credit cards 
of many of the rich and powerful. 
 
 
Implications for the future of unions  
 
What can unions offer non-union employees? 
Given that a large proportion of workers, particularly in the private sector are 
employed in non-union workplaces, which could be potentially difficult to organise, 
unions could offer individual services to workers through the extensive use of the 
  52 
Internet. UNISON in the UK for instance has designed a special website for non-
members. In 2000, it initiated www.troubleatwork.org.uk in conjunction with the 
National Union of Students, a site dedicated to providing information and advice on 
work-related problems for student workers. The topics covered range from health and 
safety issues to cont racts to holidays and time off, discrimination to joining a union. 
This way, unions could attract a large number of members and widen their social 
appeal beyond workplaces with recognition for collective bargaining. 
 
In terms of organising methods, our findings suggest that workers are more 
likely to be favourable to union representation if union activists actively encourage 
their participation in the mobilisation efforts. Unions could also increase their appeal 
among workers through persuasively communicating their achievements. Non-union 
employees are unlikely to find union representation useful if they attribute their 
employment-related problems to external market conditions. Unions could frame 
issues of collective injustice in a way that would allow workers to attribute their 
problems to their employers. Such attributions are more likely to encourage them to 
join unions and engage in collective actions. 
 
What can unions offer employers? 
Survey findings from a partnership company suggest that workers are more 
likely to trust their management and demonstrate higher levels of psychological 
contract and commitment towards their organisation if they had access to job specific 
and generic training that improved their employability both within and outside their 
organisation. By negotiating better provisions of training and development of 
workers, unions could in turn offer employers a more skilled and committed 
workforce. 
 
Can unions change their internal organisation? 
Traditional union structures geared towards securing collective bargaining 
rights for majority of workers within a bargaining unit effectively leave out million of 
union-friendly workers in non-union workplaces. Unions could offer membership and 
individual services at low cost through effective use of the Internet to all workers who 
wish to benefit from such services. Experience of labour organisations in USA e.g. 
WashTech which organises IT workers in Silicon Valley and is associated with the 
communication Workers of America (CWA) and the National Writers Union (NWU) 
does indicate that unions can change their internal organisation to become more 
inclusive and thus enhance their wider social appeal. 
 
 
Forwa rd look 
 
The research projects on social partnership and union organising campaigns 
have now progressed into a more advanced stage. We have completed surveys of two 
NHS trusts, one with a partnership agreement, the other without. Two more similar 
surveys in the banking and insurance sector will take place in November 2002. 
Qualitative data is being collected from partnership and non-partnership organisations 
where surveys have been completed. The cases have been matched by controlling for 
industry sector, size of the organisations, employers and unions (for e.g. both the NHS 
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trusts have the same CEO and the same unions). Similarly, we have selected two 
business units of the same insurance company with similar union profiles and density. 
Given the superior quality of the matches and the large sample sizes, the findings are 
likely to be more robust. Research on union organising is also expected to include 
more organising campaigns. It will also involve some matched comparisons of 
organising approaches and their outcomes (adversarial versus partnership) in the 
media and communications sector where the same union has been trying to organise 
similar groups of workers in two different workplaces using these two different 
approaches. Our findings have already provided useful insights to the participating 
organisations. For instance, it provided diagnostic information to the union attempting 
to organise university contract researchers. This information will be used to 
streamline the unions’ communication and information dissemination channels and 
the training of workplace activists. Likewise management and the Staff Committee of 
the Big Deal Co. have been informed of the preliminary findings of the employee 
survey, which they have found to be useful in reassessing the mechanisms and 
outcomes of partnership arrangement. A more detailed presentation is scheduled with 
the company for November 2002 along with the collection of qualitative data. 
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Chapter 7 
Unions and Pay Setting 
Richard Belfield 
 
Unions and pay setting in the UK 
 
Union influence over pay setting has waned in line with the long decline in 
membership strength. At the same time, the process and outcomes of pay setting in 
the economy have become progressively more heterogeneous. Assuming this 
heterogeneity is a durable development, what are the prospects for unions’ pursuit of 
an independent pay agenda in this changed environment? 
 
Union pay setting processes 
Traditionally, union involvement in pay setting has taken the form of 
collective bargaining, the fortunes of which have broadly followed those of unions’ 
organisational strength. In the post-war, this meant intermittent growth in the 
coverage of collective bargaining institutions towards a high point in the late-1970s, 
and decline in the subsequent period. However, not only has the proportion of the 
workforce covered by collective bargaining shrunk, but there is also evidence that 
even where the institution continues to exist, it has in many cases been “hollowed 
out”:  multi-employer bargaining relations have been largely abandoned, bargaining 
units are redefined downwards at the workplace level, fewer aspects of the pay 
package are open to negotiation, etc. Opportunities for union involvement in the pay-
setting process, therefore, have changed both quantitatively and qualitatively over the 
last two decades or so. 
 
Union pay outcomes 
It is no surprise that such institutional evolution contributed to the emergence 
of new patterns of pay outcomes. In particular, the longstanding connection between 
collective bargaining coverage and higher wages grew weaker. Thus, whereas in the 
1980s researchers still found that individuals covered by collective contracts typically 
enjoyed a healthy wage premium over those who were not covered, by the end of the 
1990s this premium had effectively evaporated. Collective bargaining, therefore, 
appears to have lost some of its bite during this period, as unions became increasingly 
less able to extract concessions from employers. While this shift is a notable one, it 
does not follow that collective bargaining ceased to have any impact at all on pay 
outcomes. The union wage premium may be nearly extinct, but unions and collective 
contracts continue to be strongly associated with lower levels of earnings inequality 
than the non-union sector. According to recent research, this result holds in three 
dimensions:  within workplaces, across workplaces in a given sector, and across the 
whole pay distribution by the enforcement of a de facto wage floor for covered jobs. 
These effects are of particular interest given the great expansion of pay inequality that 
has taken place in the labour market as a whole, as they indicate that unions are at 
least capable of prosecuting a limited independent agenda in the face of more 
powerful forces. In addition, they can be interpreted as evidence that unions have 
pragmatically refocused their pay strategy away from macro- level redistribution 
towards the micro level. 
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New opportunities for unions in pay setting 
If the above results suggest a steady retreat by unions from assertive collective 
bargaining — largely due to employer opposition of various types, and to their own 
diminished organisational strength — other developments in the field of pay setting 
and work organisation have opened up new opportunities for them. In the main, these 
developments stem from employer attempts to improve efficiency through the 
introduction of “flexibility” and the reordering of employee incentives. The union 
movement has acted to exploit these openings as traditional routes of intervention in 
the economy have become more and more constricted. Indeed, collectively, the new 
opportunities form the substance of the partnership strategy heralded by the TUC in 
recent years, which envisions a position for unions in the economy not only as worker 
representatives, but also as irreplaceable enablers of management goals. Perhaps the 
most prominent opportunity is that offered by the widespread introduction by 
employers of novel mechanisms of performance-related pay (PRP). 
 
Typically, these PRP schemes differ from earlier piece rate variable pay 
systems in two key ways: first, management plays a much more active role in 
determining pay outcomes in merit pay or target-based PRP than under a piece rate 
regime; and second, employers have introduced PRP in sectors of the economy that 
have little or no previous experience of incentive pay. Consequently, unions in sectors 
in which PRP is introduced can potentially play the joint role of negotiator of the 
terms upon which the new schemes are implemented, and of guardian of employee 
rights and procedural justice once PRP is operational. While they might present 
themselves differently to the two parties, though, unions are effectively offering the 
same “product” — a guarantee of some degree of certainty and stability in a very 
uncertain environment — to them both. By inserting themselves into the institutional 
structure of PRP, then, unions have the opportunity to create for themselves a 
relatively secure niche, as both employees and employers gain incentives to retain 
their services. However, given that these incentives cease to exist if either the 
establishment grows economically unviable or members feel they are gaining 
insufficient benefit, a union that follows this path is hitching its fortunes to those of 
the workplace itself. Accordingly, like the refocusing of collective bargaining 
strategy, this trend indicates that union influence is increasingly concentrated at the 
level of the workplace, precluding large-scale intervention in the political economy. 
 
Unions and PRP in public services 
One of our research projects explores the impact of the introduction of PRP in 
a sector with no historical experience of any similar system: the public services. This 
example is particularly interesting on account of the scale of the implementation of 
PRP systems, and also because it is occurring in one of the most densely unionised 
and institutionalised segments of the labour market. Therefore, the public services 
would appear to offer a paradigmatic case in which to explore the actual and potential 
role of unions in the operation of these schemes. 
 
Particular attention is granted to the effect on performance of the schemes, as 
the extent to which involvement in PRP is a viable strategy for unions is determined 
by their relative success in the eyes of management. To this end, the project 
investigates first what are the effects of such schemes on workplace performance, and 
then seeks to discover in what ways unions contribute to this. The CEP’s earlier work 
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on PRP in the public services provides evidence that these schemes can have a 
divisive effect on the workforce by their implicit or explicit comparison of workers’ 
performance, and by the one-sided nature of performance measurement. A key 
hypothesis in this study, therefore, is that independent employee representation in the 
setting up and administration of these new types of pay system will cause them to 
operate more successfully. 
 
The project methodology is designed to measure change over time, and current 
changes in public service performance pay systems mean that there is scope to carry 
out such ‘over time’ studies in a number of areas. Currently, though, the ana lysis is 
limited to schoolteachers but will be extended subsequently to the Inland Revenue and 
other parts of the civil service.  
 
In 2000, a new pay system was introduced for classroom teachers in England 
and Wales which introduced an important element of performance pay into their 
salaries, which constituted a radical break with past pay systems. The research 
conducted in 2001 involved two elements: 
· An analysis of the “before and after” study of teachers’ responses to the new 
scheme. 
· An analysis of the potential role of unions in promoting ‘procedural justice’ 
under new pay systems. 
 
Seven conclusions emerge from these initial analyses: 
· Some of the early opposition to the principle of linking pay to performance, 
and to pupil progress appears to have abated slightly. 
· The new performance management system does not appear to have had a 
major effect on teachers’ motivation to perform well. 
· Teachers remain highly committed to their schools. 
· Despite the very high success rate at the threshold, many still believe there is a 
quota. 
· On the whole, it has not proved divisive and caused reduced cooperation with 
management within schools. 
· It appears to assist communication between management and staff over school 
and work objectives. 
· It has enhanced the role of middle management within schools. 
 
Much work remains to be done to complement these findings. Notably, further 
analysis will be undertaken in the following areas: 
 
· Exploration of how responses to PRP differ among different types of schools. 
· Comparison based on those who responded to both the “before” and “after” 
surveys to see how their views changed in relation to PRP (using a matched 
sample). 
· Analysis in greater detail of the replies of head teachers as to the effects of 
PRP on their schools. 
 
The next stage will be to carry out the second wave of the study of teachers’ 
PRP, and to set up a similar study in the Inland Revenue and other parts of the Civil 
Service, again with the idea of following a panel of employees over time. There is 
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considerable potential for further study of PRP in differing public-service 
environments, as table 7.1 indicates. In the Civil Service, in particular, it should be 
possible to identify a sample of offices that correspond to performance units within 
the organisation, and thus to compare motivation effects with measures of 
organisational performance. In addition, it is planned to develop measures of the 
effectiveness of local union representation to attempt measure procedural justice 
effects. 
 
 
Table 7.1 
Summary details of PRP schemes available for study 
 
Organisation Type of scheme Treatment of employees at 
the top of their respective 
pay span 
Per cent on 
their pay span 
maximum 
Inland 
Revenue 1991 
Employees move up existing seniority 
pay scale faster on receipt of good 
appraisal by line manager. Appraisal 
against standardised criteria. 
Smaller % merit increases 
for higher-level grades and 
limit of 3 increments 
above span max for merit 
payments. 
69 
Inland 
Revenue 1996 
No seniority scales. Appraised as 
‘Succeeding’ at agreed targets brings 
pay increase, and ‘Exceeding’ brings 
additional increase, as does 
‘Succeeding’ at jobs classified ‘extra 
loaded’. No inflation increase in some 
years. 
Smaller % merit payments 
as staff progress up the 
pay span for their grade, 
and restrictions on 
overlapping with grade 
above. 
51 
Employment 
Service 
No seniority scales. Pay increase 
depends on achieving appraised 
performance objectives & is based on 
a share of a negotiated pot. 
Performance pay above 
the maximum for the 
grade is non-consolidated. 
59 
NHS hospital 
– individual 
PRP 
No seniority scale. Pay increase 
dependent on appraised individual 
performance. 
No scale max but bonus 
for above average 
performance is non-
consolidated. 
Not 
applicable 
NHS hospital 
– trust-wide 
bonus 
No seniority scale. Pay increase 
depends on trust-wide bonus, poor 
performers only excluded. 
Bonus at the grade 
maximum becomes 
entirely non-consolidated. 
30 (trust 
contracts); 80 
(Whitley 
contracts)  
School head 
teachers 
Additional movement up pay spine for 
appraised excellent performance by 
school governors. No seniority 
increments. 
No limit on additional 
spine points that may be 
awarded. 
Not 
applicable 
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Unions and pay setting in an international comparative perspective 
 
While UK unions are most influential in pay setting at the workplace level, 
this is not the case in much of the rest of the EU, where they can influence the 
distribution of rewards at a higher level of the political economy. In addition, there are 
great differences in the structures of pay in comparison with the UK, particularly as 
regards wage inequality. Is there a relationship between these observations? 
 
Relative centralisation of pay setting 
Of particular interest is the degree of centralisation of pay setting in a national 
economy, as this matter is strongly associated with the influence that labour 
movements are able to bring to bear on pay determination. Whereas in the UK union 
influence has become almost completely atomised—the public sector excepted — 
since the late-1970s, in many other European countries the recent trend has been 
towards greater centralisation of union involvement in pay setting. Evidently, this is 
made possible in that these countries’ unions typically enjoy much greater coverage of 
collective bargaining across the workforce, a legacy of continuing political and 
institutional strength, and of less hostile regulatory and economic environments. 
However, the contrast is still remarkable. The catalyst for this trend was the need to 
meet the macroeconomic targets for EMU, with governments crafting coordinated 
wage policies with the assistance of the unions, but even now nearly 3 years after the 
inception of the system, there have been no apparent moves to disassemble the newly 
centralised pay setting machinery. What is most notable about this absence of reaction 
is its inconsistency with the axiom that the global economy has recently changed in 
ways that favour flexibility and the local tailoring of economic relations. As the 
European economy as a whole has yet to implode under the weight of such rigidities, 
the question must be asked whether the traditional equation of centralisation of pay 
setting with inflexibility is entirely correct, or if the story has moved on. Whatever the 
answer, the process of pay setting has surely evolved very differently elsewhere in the 
EU than it has in the UK in response to the same external pressures. 
 
Pay inequality 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, unions in many EU countries pursued to 
varying degrees wage policies that sought to reduce the inequality of earnings among 
workers. The reasons for this varied: from the reduction of economy-wide pay 
differentials in countries where unions have been organised on corporatist lines, to 
radical policies to combat hierarchy and Taylorism in the enterprise such as were 
formulated by plant-based union organisations in Italy in the early 1970s. Such 
policies typically exerted a substantial effect on national pay distributions, and despite 
the emergence of less favourable government and business policies in labour markets 
during the 1980s, wage inequalities continued to decline for some time in countries 
such as Germany. However, this was not a uniform trend: the UK, as noted above, led 
the pack in the shift from diminishing to accelerating earnings inequality, beginning a 
wild ride towards greater inequality in the late-1970s that only slowed in the late-
1990s. Moderate growth in inequality has been the most common trend elsewhere in 
the EU during the last decade or so, although countries such as Germany and Italy still 
tend towards little change at all. In any case — as with the matter of centralisation of 
pay setting — the UK appears again to be an outlying case. Furthermore, the 
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considerable variation among EU countries in recent experience vis-à-vis pay 
inequality is a subject that has yet to be adequately explored. 
 
Pay inequalities and economic performance (PIEP) project 
As part of this project, we will be tackling the questions raised above about the 
nature and effects of union influence on pay setting in several EU countrie s — to 
begin with, the UK, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, Italy, and Spain, with the possibility 
of adding Germany and France at a later date. Our core resource is access to the 
microdata from the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES), which 
offers an unparalleled opportunity to explore many dimensions of changing pay 
inequalities: between occupations, industries, by gender, age, seniority, plant size and 
so on. By integrating this data set with previous (tabular) version of the survey — 
dating from 1978, 1972 and 1966 — and with national time series microdata that run 
up to the present, we will be able to approach research questions from both historical 
and comparative points of view. Until now, much of the work on the reduction of pay 
inequalities has relied on broad indicators of pay dispersions, and have been based on 
surveys that were poorly comparable across countries. However, because the ESES 
has been conducted with a common methodology in all countries, and its categories 
are comparable, we can make advance beyond the envelope demarked by previous 
studies. 
 
As a result of technical delays with access to our core data set, we cannot yet 
present any results. We expect to finish drafts of our first analyses during 2003. There 
are two lines of enquiry that relate to union influences: 
 
· Centralisation and inequality: this analysis takes a long-term perspective of 
change along both of these dimensions, and seeks to answer the question of 
whether centralisation of pay setting and equality always and everywhere go 
hand in hand — as is commonly assumed in the literature — or if there is a 
more attenuated relationship at work. 
 
· Union effects on pay under differing collective bargaining regimes: in this 
cross-sectional study of 1995 data, we hope to deconstruct the relationship 
between unions and pay levels and patterns across countries with different 
institutional and structural attributes. In particular we are interested in 
separating union organisation effects from country effects, as this would 
enable us to break away from some of the country stereotypes that have 
characterised international comparisons. For example, do sectors with 
centralised bargaining have common patterns of wage inequalities no matter 
which country they are in? 
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Chapter 8 
Unions and Performance 
Alex Bryson 
 
Summary 
 
· The union wage premium has been in decline since the mid-1990s. By 2001 
the premium appears to have disappeared. However, this seems to be a 
cyclical effect due to the up-turn in the economy, rather than a secular decline. 
 
· Unions continue to wield the ‘sword of justice’, having an egalitarian effect on 
the distribution of pay, cutting accidents and promoting both family friendly 
and equal opportunity policies in the workplace. 
 
· Higher levels of reported job dissatisfaction among union members relative to 
non-members are not attributable to unions, but to the type of jobs done by 
union members, the types of employees who become union members, and the 
workplaces that employ them. Thus, unions have no damaging effect on job 
satisfaction, a finding that is contrary to the perceived wisdom. 
 
· Employee and employer perceptions of the industrial relations climate differ 
according to the strength of the union, bargaining arrangements adopted and 
managerial attitudes to membership. Employee perceptions of climate are also 
strongly positively associated with employee perceptions of union 
effectiveness. 
 
 
What can unions do? 
 
What do unions do? The question has been asked many times. What do they 
do for (or to) employers who let them onto their premises? What do they do for 
members who pay their union dues? And what do they do to non-members who, 
although they do not participate directly in the union, may nevertheless feel the effects 
of their activity? These questions are central to answering the question ‘what future 
do trade unions have in modern Britain?’ because only if unions can persuade 
employees and employers that they have something to gain from unionisation will 
unions survive and prosper. 
 
One way of looking at this is to consider what are the outcomes from being 
unionised versus not being unionised. In other words, how do employers and 
employees perform in the presence of unions, compared to what their performance 
would have been like in the absence of unions. There are many technical difficulties 
in isolating the causal effect of unionisation that make interpretation of union 
performance studies hazardous. This is particularly so where we try to evaluate 
changes in union effects over time. However, this is the natural focus of research 
efforts, since analysts, practitioners and policy makers are concerned to understand 
what effect two decades of union decline has had on performance. 
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Broadly speaking, unions perform three functions. 
· They negotiate on behalf of their members for better terms and conditions of 
employment.  
· They offer workers a voice with which to articulate their interests and 
concerns to management. 
· They act as an agent for the employer in the management of employees, 
assisting the employer in the monitoring and enforcement of worker effort. 
 
Under each role, unions could have both positive and negative effects on firm and 
employee performance. 
· Bargaining: if it is assumed that unions can achieve a wage premium only by 
taking a larger slice of the profits pie than would otherwise be the case, these 
gains will be made at the expense of the firm’s performance and, ultimately, 
employment levels. However, if one accepts that union activity may also 
affect the size of the available pie, bargaining outcomes are no longer a zero 
sum game: employees may gain without it being at the expense of managers. 
The bargaining process itself may increase the size of the pie, for instance, 
through productivity enhancements arising through the motivational effects on 
union members who might be better off than they would be in the absence of a 
union.  
 
· Voice: workers may be better motivated and management better informed 
where unions operate as an effective voice for workers, resulting in improved 
performance. On the other hand, union voice can politicise employees and, 
through improved information flows, increase awareness of managerial 
shortcomings, leading to lower job satisfaction and de-motivation, which may 
feed through to lower productivity. 
 
· Agency: whether performance is better when the union acts as an agent in the 
management of employees, relative to a non-union environment in which 
management takes on the whole function itself, depends on the nature of the 
union and what management is using to manage employees in the absence of a 
union. 
 
 
The effect of union strength on performance 
 
Union decline over the last two decades has probably had two conflicting 
effects on unions’ impact on performance. On the one hand, many weaker union 
enclaves may have disappeared. Those remaining have survived because they were 
‘fitter’ or stronger, in which case union effects (positive or negative) on performance 
may be more pronounced than hitherto. Alternatively, where unions continue to exist, 
union density has declined, potentially weakening unions’ influence over 
performance. In fact, workplace survey evidence suggests that the union sector has 
become more heterogeneous, with weak and strong unionism evident by the end of 
the 1990s. This implies that reference to an ‘average’ union effect is increasingly 
outmoded, and greater emphasis should be placed on the contingent nature of the 
union effect. This point also holds for other dimensions of unionism such as the 
product market in which it operates and employer support or opposition for the work 
done by the union. 
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Weaker unions may be less effective than stronger unions in all three roles, but 
this implies different union effects from those expected of strong unionism, rather 
than no union effects at all. For example, weak unionism may be more damaging than 
non-unionism where employers have to meet the costs of engaging with a union, 
while obtaining none of the benefits accruing through effective worker voice or 
effective agency. From an employee perspective, weak voice may be sufficient to 
politicise the workforce, but insufficient to ‘deliver’, whereupon the effects may be 
damaging for worker morale and thus productivity. Predictions from strong unionism 
are also uncertain, a priori. Strong unions may be better rent-seekers than weaker 
unions, but they may also have better opportunities to improve workplace 
performance in their voice and agency roles. 
 
 
Empirical evidence of unions’ influence on performance 
 
With this framework in mind, the rest of this section reviews recent evidence 
on unions’ impact on performance across five broad sets of outcomes which are 
central to workers’ quality of life and Britain’s economic well-being. 
 
Employee attitudes to their jobs 
Unions influence the way that workers (union members and non-members) 
feel about various aspects of their jobs, such as job satisfaction, job security, and the 
influence employees think they have over decisions which affect their jobs. To date, 
the programme has focused on job satisfaction. Bryson, Cappellari and Lucifora find 
that higher levels of reported job dissatisfaction among union members relative to 
non-members are not attributable to unions’ voice effect in politicising workers, but to 
the type of jobs done by union members, the types of employees who become union 
members, and the workplaces that employ them. Thus, unions have no damaging 
effect on job satisfaction, a finding that is contrary to the perceived wisdom.  
 
The quality of workplace governance 
Unions can affect the quality of workplace governance, as indicated by 
employee perceptions of managerial performance, trust in management and the 
climate of employee relations. Both the strength and direction of union effects differ 
according to the nature of the union and employer responses to unions. Employees’ 
perceptions of workplace governance are poorest where unions are weak but where 
there is a balance of power between unions and management at the workplace, they 
are at least as good as perceptions in non-unionised workplaces. Second, employee 
perceptions of workplace governance are best where managers support union 
membership, and are poorest where managers oppose membership. Third, employees’ 
perceptions of workplace governance are poorest where unions are perceived as 
ineffective.  
 
The significance of the findings is two-fold. First, managerial support for 
unions and union membership, and a preparedness to engage seriously with unions, 
brings rewards in terms of better governance, whereas management opposition to 
unions is detrimental to climate. This is consistent with the notion that the workplace 
can benefit from social partnership. Second, unions are beneficial where employees 
viewed them as effective in ‘delivering’ for them. Future research will answer the key 
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question which arises, namely under what conditions are employers supportive of 
unions and employees perceive unions as effective? This will help us identify what 
sorts of unionisation are viable in future. 
 
Unions improve employees’ terms and conditions 
In the late 1990s, unions continued to improve employees’ fringe benefits such 
as pension provision and sick pay. They also improved employees’ working 
environment, for example by reducing accidents at work. But there is some dispute 
over the size of the union membership wage premium. 
 
Bryson asks how much of the wage differential between union members and 
non-members is attributable to union membership, and how much is due to 
differences in personal, job and workplace characteristics across members and non-
members? He finds a raw union premium for the private sector of 17-25% of gross 
hourly wages, depending on the sub-group analysed. However, comparing union 
members with ‘like’ non-members, this difference falls to between 3% and 6%. This 
indicates that the higher pay of unionised workers is largely accounted for by their 
better underlying earnings capacity, which is associated with their individual 
characteristics, the jobs they do and the workplaces they find themselves in. However, 
a small premium is still evident. There is further evidence of a premium in the work 
of Bryson, Cappellari and Lucifora who find union members’ dissatisfaction with pay 
is less pronounced than dissatisfaction with other aspects of their job, relative to non-
members, pointing to union effect in procuring a compensating wage differential.  
 
Machin investigates a related question. Does it still pay to be in a trade union? 
And, does it still pay to join a trade union? For men the answer is: it used to pay and it 
used to pay to join but by the end of the 1990s it does not. For women the answer is: 
yes it does still pay, but not by as much as it used to, and it does not pay to newly join.  
 
Bryson’s and Machin’s results differ somewhat because they use different data 
sets and different techniques on different populations (private sector in the case of 
Bryson and whole economy in the case of Machin). Future research will seek to 
reconcile results by using alternative techniques on similar data. Nevertheless, both 
studies indicate a premium that is lower than that suggested in earlier studies. Bryson 
and Gomez directly address the question of whether the union wage premium has 
fallen over time. They conclude that the premium has fallen since the mid-1990s, but 
tentative ly suggest that this may be a cyclical effect due to the up-turn in the 
economy, rather than a secular decline. In any event, since the union wage premium is 
the most visible benefit from union membership, its demise may create problems for 
unions in recruiting and retaining members. On the other hand, it implies that unions 
have a less detrimental impact on firm performance (see below). 
 
Union effects on pay relativities and discrimination 
Because unions have traditionally organised less well-paid workers, because 
they represent the median worker, and because they are guided by principles of 
collective solidarity and equity, unions operate as a ‘sword of justice’, tackling pay 
inequality, pay discrimination and low pay by altering procedures governing the 
contract of employment and challenging the ways in which employers set pay. The 
health of unions turns, in part, on their appeal to potential members so their ‘sword of  
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justice’ impact is important. In spite of recent decline, unions continue to have an 
egalitarian effect on the distribution of pay, cut accidents and promote both family 
friendly and equal opportunity policies in the workplace. 
 
Union effects on economic performance 
Four points emerge from a recent review of union effects on financial 
performance, productivity, workplace closure and employment growth. 
 
· Negative union effects on productivity levels and growth in the 1980s have 
abated (though negative effects are still apparent where there is fragmented 
bargaining), and there are indications of a positive effect on productivity 
growth where unions are weaker, perhaps resulting from reductions in 
restrictive practices and/or employment where unions are less able to maintain 
staffing levels. Alternatively productivity levels may have improved in the 
unionised sector if less productive unionised workplaces had higher closure 
rates. 
· The negative effects that unions had on financial performance in the 1980s 
seem to have all disappeared (being confined to fragmented collective 
bargaining) – a finding that is consistent with a decline in the wage premium. 
· Unions raised the probability of workplace closure in the 1990s, whereas they 
had no effect in the 1980s.  
· Unions recognition was associated with reduced employment growth by 3-4% 
relative to non-unionised workplaces in the 1990s, similar to their effect in the 
1980s. 
 
So evidence on unions’ impact on workplace performance is mixed, but there 
is little evidence that unions either detract from or enhance productivity or profits. 
The differential rate of employment decline in the unionised sector is particularly 
problematic for unions because it suggests a rate of decline that even the most 
effective organising of new workplaces is unlikely to make up for. Bryson and 
Machin are continuing to investigate links between unions and the performance of 
companies and are in the process of analysing survey returns. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Empirical analyses rarely explore the potentially cross-cutting effects of 
unions arising from the different functions they perform. Arguably, these functions 
are also under-theorised, so that it is sometimes difficult to generate testable 
hypotheses that distinguish among the roles. 
 
Increased heterogeneity across unions, and in managerial responses to unions, implies 
that focusing solely on union average effects will result in an increasingly partial 
understanding of union effects. The question is not so much ‘what are unions doing 
now?’ but ‘which unions are doing what, and how are employers responding?’ Some 
findings relating to industrial relations outcomes (job satisfaction, trust in 
management, climate) are relatively positive from a union perspective since they point 
to conditions under which employers and employees may benefit from unionisation 
(table 8.1). 
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Table 8.1 
Unions and industrial relations performance 
Study Outcome Union measure Findings 
1. Employee perceptions of IR/management 
Bryson (2003b) Employee perceptions 
of managerial 
performance, WERS 
1998 
Recognition, on-site and 
off-site representation 
Perceptions of managerial 
responsiveness better 
among employees with 
non-union voice than they 
are among employees with 
union voice 
Bryson (2001b) Employee perceptions in 
WERS98 
Recognition, on-site 
representation, density, 
bargaining 
arrangements, 
bargaining coverage, 
management attitudes to 
unions, perceived union 
effectiveness 
-ve effect of strong union, 
weak unions NS; -ve 
where on-site rep, NS 
where no rep; -ve effect of 
fragmented bargaining; -ve 
effect where no 
management support; -ve 
where ineffective, +ve 
where effective 
Bryson (2001a, 2001c) Employee trust in 
management, BSA 
1983-1998 
Recognition, 
perceptions of union 
power and union 
effectiveness 
+ve where balance of 
power between unions and 
management; +ve where 
management supports 
membership; -ve where 
management actively 
discourages membership; 
+ve where union perceived 
as effective 
Ramsay et al. (2000) Employee perceptions 
of IR climate in 
WERS98 
Union density -ve effect of higher density 
Bryson (1999b) Employee perceptions 
of IR climate, BSA98 
Union recognition, on-
site representatives, 
employee perceptions of 
union power 
-ve effect of recognised 
union, and –ve effect of 
on-site rep; -ve effect of 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ unions 
2. Employer perceptions of IR climate  
Bryson (2001b) Managerial perceptions 
in WERS98 
Recognition, on-site 
representation, density,  
bargaining 
arrangements, 
bargaining coverage, 
management attitudes to 
unions 
-ve effect of strong and 
weak unions; -ve where no 
on-site rep, NS where on-
site rep; -ve effect where 
no management support  
Addison and Belfield 
(2001) 
Managerial perceptions 
in WERS98 
Union recognition, 
closed shop/man. 
Endorsement 
Not significant 
Cully et al. (1999) Managerial perceptions 
in WERS98 
Union recognition Not significant 
 
3. Employee job satisfaction 
Bryson et al. (2002) Employee job 
satisfaction and pay 
satisfaction  
Union membership, 
density, recognition 
Not significant 
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Table 8.2 
Unions and economic performance 
Study Outcome Union measure Findings 
1.  Wage premium 
Blanchflower and Bryson 
(2003) 
Gross hourly earnings, 
1985-2001, whole 
economy and 
disaggregated 
Union membership Declined since mid-1990s, 
but anti-cyclical not 
secular.  Level and 
significance in 2000-2001 
depends on data set 
Bryson and Gomez (2002) Gross hourly earnings, 
1985-2001, whole 
economy  
Union membership Declined since mid-1990s, 
but anti-cyclical not 
secular.  +2.5% in 2001 is 
ns 
Bryson (2002) Gross hourly earnings, 
1998, private sector 
Union membership NS in whole private sector 
and covered occupations; 
+6% in covered 
workplaces; +ve confined 
to 50%+ density and older 
workplaces 
Machin (2001) Gross hourly wages 
earnings, 1991-99, 
whole economy  
Union membership By 1999, ns for men, +ve 
for women 
Forth and Millward (2002) Gross hourly earnings, 
1998, private sector 
Coverage, multi-
unionism 
+8% where 70-99% 
coverage; +12% if multi-
union, otherwise NS 
2.  Labour productivity    
Pencavel (2001) Labour productivity 
levels in 1998 and 
1990 
Any union members 
present and bargaining 
arrangements 
Union members –ve on 
levels in 1990 but ns in 
1998.  Fragmented 
bargaining –ve on levels in 
1990 and 1998.   
Addison and Belfield 
(2001) 
Labour productivity 
levels in 1998 and 
change, 1993-98 
Union recognition, 
closed shop/man. 
Endorsement 
No effect on levels; weak 
unions +ve on change 
3.  Financial performance 
Pencavel (2002) Financial performance, 
WERS98 and WIRS90 
Any union members 
present and bargaining 
arrangements 
Union members –ve in 
1990 and 1998, driven by 
fragmented bargaining 
Bryson and Wilkinson 
(2002) 
Financial performance, 
WERS98 
Recognition, coverage, 
bargaining arrangement, 
bargaining levels  
Generally no significant 
effect; industry-level +ve 
sig 
Addison and Belfield 
(2001) 
Financial performance, 
WERS98 
Union recognition, 
closed shop/man. 
Endorsement 
No significant effects 
Addison and Belfield 
(2000) 
Financial performance 
in WERS98 
Union recognition No significant effects 
4.  Employment growth 
Bryson (2001d) Employment growth, 
1990-98 
Union recognition, 
bargaining arrangements 
-3-4%; not significant 
where union negotiated 
wages and employment 
Addison and Belfield 
(2001) 
Employment growth, 
1993-98 
Union recognition, 
closed shop, man. 
Endorsement 
-ve 
5.  Workplace closure    
Bryson (2003a) Workplace closure, 
1990-98 
Recognition, bargaining 
arrangements 
+ve, but size and direction 
of effect sensitive to nature 
of union, closure definition 
Addison, Heywood and 
Wei (2001) 
Workplace closure, 
1990-98 
Union recognition +ve, only where part of 
larger organisation 
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The situation is less clear-cut with respect to economic outcomes (table 8.2). 
With the possible exception of multi-union environments, the wage and productivity 
effects of unionisation are much smaller today than they used to be, so it is not 
surprising that unions have little effect on profitability. However, unions continue to 
have a detrimental impact on employment growth, lowering it by around 3-4%. This 
appears to be a bargaining effect. It is confined to unions with bargaining strength and 
where unions negotiate over wages but not employment. Where they negotiated over 
employment, growth rates were not significantly different from those in non-
unionised workplaces. This suggests unions modify their wage claims where 
management involves them in decisions over employment, or else the relationship 
between management and unions is qualitatively different in these circumstances in 
such a way as to ameliorate the negative effects of unions. Although the evidence is 
less clear cut, there are also indications that unions increased closure rates in the 
1990s. Here the effect is not due to bargaining strength, but it is a union voice effect, 
as opposed to a worker voice effect per se, since non-union voice had no such impact. 
Our conjecture is that, in some cases, unions may have become less effective as a 
voice for workers and as an agent for employers. 
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Chapter 9 
Unions and Equity 
Helen Bewley 
 
Key findings 
 
· Unions offer workers greater equity by reducing wage dispersion and raising 
the pay of women. They are also associated with greater equality of 
opportunity, as employers who recognise a union are likely to have a range of 
equal opportunities policies, and some family-friendly practices. 
· Unions are of value to employers in managing the workforce and informing 
them of the problems experienced when implementing equal opportunities and 
family-friendly policies in the workplace. 
· Although many workers are not hostile to unions, there are significant barriers 
to union membership including fear of victimisation, reluctance to pay 
membership subscriptions amongst the low paid, and the perceived irrelevance 
of trade unions to highly-skilled workers who are willing to voice their 
concerns to management personally, or are able to find alternative 
employment relatively easily. 
 
 
Issues and methods of investigation 
 
What do unions offer workers traditionally disadvantaged in the labour market 
e.g. women, racial and ethnic minorities, gay and lesbian workers and those with 
long-term disabilities? This research involves assessing whether unions are 
responding to work-life balance concerns and representing the interests of those who 
may experience discrimination. It addresses the effect of gender composition, sexual 
orientation, union experience and sectoral characteristics on attitudes to unions and 
the success of union campaigns. We also consider the potential for unions to organise 
vulnerable groups of workers, the issues that they need to address, and the extent to 
which employers can affect, for good or ill, the perceived usefulness of the union to 
workers. In relation to the disadvantage experienced by employees bearing primary 
responsibility for the family, we are investigating whether equal opportunities or 
family-friendly issues are a potentially fruitful concern around which unions can 
organise. This includes assessing the attractiveness of such policies to employers. 
 
We are using a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate 
our research questions. The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98) 
has been analysed to assess whether nationally women are more likely to have access 
to equal opportunity and family-friendly policies where a union is recognised. In 
addition, we have considered whether unionised workplaces are more likely to offer 
such policies than workplaces run along human resource management (HRM) lines. 
WERS98 has also been used to assess whether, on average, employers offering 
family-friendly policies have better performance than those without such policies, 
allowing us to consider whether one strategy unions might pursue in seeking to raise 
membership would be to encourage employers to adopt such policies. The British 
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Household Panel Survey has been used to assess whether it pays for women to be in, 
or join a union, and the Labour Force Survey to examine differences in pay between 
unionised and non-union workers with regard to gender, race and other factors. 
 
Aside from secondary data analysis, we are also collecting primary data. In 
particular, we are conducting case studies, including a local labour market study of 
Brighton and Hove. This study is investigating equality and representation through in-
depth interviews and a detailed structured questionnaire. Participants include workers 
in the new media, refuse collection and childcare sectors, and clerical staff. We are 
also interviewing union representatives, employers and employees in comparable 
unionised and non-union firms, and union officials and members of union self-
organised lesbian and gay groups. In addition we have undertaken a large survey of 
commuters, as well as a survey of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual 
community.  
 
 
Findings 
 
Our analysis of WERS98 has shown that employees are more likely to have 
access to equal opportunities policies where their employer recognises a trade union 
for the purposes of negotiating pay and conditions than where there is no union 
recognition, controlling for a range of other workplace characteristics (table 9.1). 
Employees are also more likely to have access to some family-friendly policies where 
a union is recognised. However, these policies do not appeal to all employees, even 
where their working conditions, for example, long working hours or inflexibility of 
employment, suggest that the practices would be beneficial. New media workers in 
the local labour market study were expected to work long hours, felt insecure in their 
jobs and lacked control over their work. Also, they did not generally express hostility 
to unions. However, these workers tend to be young and without family 
responsibilities, and any job dissatisfaction that they experience in the main arises 
from the nature of their work rather than working conditions. Therefore the fact that 
unions might tackle long working hours did little to encourage union membership. 
 
Table 9.1 
Use of equal opportunity and family-friendly policies by union recognition 
 Proportion of workplaces with practice, from: 
 Workplaces with 
union recognition 
Workplaces without 
union recognition 
   
Formal written equal opportunities policy on gender 82.1 42.3 
Statistics collected on posts held by gender 40.6 15.4 
Monitor promotions by gender 20.6 5.4 
Review selection procedures to identify indirect discrimination 36.9 9.9 
Measure effects of equal opportunities policy 20.4 4.8 
Parental leave 54.5 21.8 
Working from home 15.3 10.9 
Term-time only working 24.2 10.0 
Switching from full- to part-time employment 58.2 37.8 
Job-sharing 48.8 15.4 
Workplace nursery, or nursery linked with workplace 6.3 1.4 
Financial help with childcare 5.9 2.6 
Note and source: From WERS98, all workplaces with 10 or more employees 
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Initial research findings suggest that lesbian and gay workers in the new 
economy sector also generally express positive feelings towards unions, but do not 
identify them as a potential source of help in tackling discrimination. For both new 
media workers, and lesbian and gay workers in lower- level new economy jobs, the 
response to job dissatisfaction is to seek alternative employment, or for new media 
workers to set up their own firm. It also appears that lesbian and gay workers in 
higher- level jobs appear to seek employment in sectors with more tolerant 
environments. The fact that, although lesbian and gay workers are not hostile towards 
unions, they pursue exit rather than voice, or avoid particular sectors, indicates that 
they do not yet see unions as an appropriate mechanism for dealing with the problems 
they experience in the workplace.  
 
Our findings suggest links between gender, union density and success in 
pursuing union objectives. Predominantly male, and highly unionised refuse workers 
in Brighton and Hove were successful in persuading the local authority to take the 
refuse collection contract back into the public sector after a five-day sit- in. In contrast, 
childcare is a female-dominated sector of employment, characterised by varied levels 
of union membership and involvement. Unionisation is higher among the higher 
qualified and those still attached to the public sector and it is notable that a large 
number of learning support assistants were involved in the strike by council workers 
(17 July 2002). However, the recent rapid expansion of childcare under the National 
Childcare Strategy has been in the private sector where unionisation is low or non-
existent. Our research has demonstrated that unions need to take a very careful 
approach to organising these workers if they are to be successful in recruiting and 
retaining them. Whilst most employees who had experienced union membership 
viewed unions positively, childcare workers reported that unions were unresponsive 
to their concerns and correspondingly were unwilling to pay the “subs” from their 
meagre pay. The union had therefore been unsuccessful in engaging with these 
workers, at least in the private sector. 
 
Although WERS98 and the local labour market study demonstrate that larger 
workplaces are more likely to offer formal practices to facilitate work-life balance, it 
is noted that smaller workplaces perhaps operate informal practices. It is also apparent 
that workplaces with formal equal opportunities policies and family-friendly practices 
may not actually provide equality of opportunity. For example, the local labour 
market study presented clear evidence that whilst employers are keen to stress their 
commitment to equality, in practice they sometimes fall short of providing this. For 
example, employment agencies who formally declined to supply staff on non-job-
related criteria e.g. a “long- legged blonde” receptionist, did in reality try to find 
workers they thought would be favoured by the client, even where the client did not 
ask for workers to have particular non-job-related characteristics. 
 
An important question for unions is whether employers are able to reduce 
potential union support by offering terms and conditions that employees would 
otherwise seek through a union. The local labour market study also suggests that the 
existence of informal channels of communication between managers and employees 
can reduce the demand for union membership. However, the study of the use of 
flexible and family-friendly work options, suggest that even where employers offer 
apparently family-friendly practices, unions still have an important role to play in 
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ensuring that the benefit of these practices to employees are maximised. For example, 
in the retail sector, whilst firms may appear to offer employees the chance to work 
flexible hours around their family commitments, in reality, they can be put under 
pressure to work longer hours than they wish and at times which have a negative 
impact on work- life balance. This suggests that unions have a role in overseeing the 
implementation of flexible practices where they are offered by the employer. 
 
Our local labour market studies have identified parallels between employment 
agencies and trade unions in that employment agencies negotiate wages with 
employers on behalf of their staff, as do unions, and workers approach the agency 
when they experience problems with their employer, as they might alternatively 
approach a trade union. This suggests that employers can perhaps seek to minimise 
the threat of unionisation by using agency staff. However, unions were successful in 
gaining the support of agency workers in the sit- in by refuse collectors, despite the 
fact that agency workers only received two-thirds of the pay of permanent staff. The 
success of this union campaign was perhaps in part due to the fact that besides the 
agency workers receiving much lower pay, the refuse workers had experienced four 
different employers in four years, with workers recruited at different times employed 
on different contracts. The disparities in terms and conditions amongst workers 
employed to do the same job appear to have united the refuse collectors in a sense of 
unfairness at this inequality. Clearly employer practices, such as HRM, or using 
agency staff, affect the extent to which union membership is regarded as worthwhile, 
but unions do appear to be key to the provision of actual equality, suggesting that 
there is still potential for unions to win the support of employees. 
 
Our analysis of WERS98 has revealed that workplaces that offer a range of 
family-friendly policies have better financial performance and labour productivity and 
lower absenteeism and voluntary resignation rates, than those without such practices, 
but that there are important differences in the types of family-friendly policies offered 
by employers. The local labour market study has identified differences between 
employer- and employee- led flexibility which can be complementary or in conflict. 
For example, retail workers may be able to choose working hours which fit around 
their family commitments, or alternatively be required to work particular hours in 
order to meet surges in demand. From our analysis of WERS98 we find that 
workplace performance is considerably better when family-friendly policies which 
enable employees with families to maintain their presence in the workplace are 
offered, rather than those which depend on reducing hours, or reducing workplace 
visibility, which perhaps also lowers access to training, promotion opportunities and 
information about the workplace. 
 
Finally, we find that unions play a role in closing the wage gap between 
various groups of workers. They reduce pay differences between women and men, 
racial and ethnic minorities and whites, those with long-term disabilities which affect 
their work and the fully-able, manual and non-manual workers. Women earn more in 
unionised workplaces than in those without a union and further, workers get increased 
access to family-friendly policies where a union is recognised for negotiating pay and 
conditions than in a non-union workplace. 
 
  76 
Implications for the future of unions  
 
What can unions offer non-union employees? 
Given that unions reduce wage dispersion, and raise the pay of women, they 
offer non-union workers greater equity. They are also associated with greater equality 
of opportunity, as employees in workplaces with union recognition are more likely to 
be covered by a range of equal opportunities policies, and some family-friendly 
policies. There is the potential for unions to do more to address equality between 
workers employed on different types of contract e.g. agency workers. Unions also 
have a role to play in ensuring that flexible working reflects the needs of employees.  
 
What can unions offer employers? 
Some family-friendly policies are associated with better performance, whilst 
others are not, in part due to the fact that they reduce the likelihood that employees 
taking them up receive training and information about the workplace. Also, the case 
study of a retail sector workplace has demonstrated that there can be considerable 
divergence between flexible working practices agreed by unions and management at 
the national level and the way in which policies are implemented in the workplace. 
Therefore, unions can provide an important service to employers by informing them 
of problems in the operation of such policies. This should then allow employers to 
benefit fully from the family-friendly practices that they offer, maximising the 
productivity of employees. Evidence from the local labour market study also suggests 
that unions help employers to manage the workforce. 
 
Can unions change their internal organisation? 
It is hoped that it may be possible to address this question in future research by 
contrasting the way that self-organised groups within unions (Unison has lead the way 
in developing these groups) are organised with the way that lesbian and gay activist 
groups outside the union behave in terms of efficiency and responsiveness to grass-
roots issues. 
 
 
Forward look 
 
Whilst non-union workers do not seem to be generally hostile to unions, many 
regard them as irrelevant, even though unions are associated with greater access to 
equal opportunities and family-friendly policies, higher pay for women, and reduced 
pay dispersion among workers. Case study research in the retail and engineering 
sectors has revealed that unions face difficulties recruiting women at both ends of the 
pay spectrum, as whilst women in low-paid and part-time employment who decline to 
join a trade union often express an unwillingness to pay union subscriptions, 
professional workers in better-paid employment refuse membership on the grounds 
that they feel happy to take their concerns to management themselves. By contrast, 
women workers in the retail sector were thought to avoid involvement in union 
activities because they did not want to become embroiled in a possible confrontation 
with management and feared victimisation. 
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HRM practices present a challenge to unions in terms of presenting alternative 
ways for employees to attain their demands at work, although even where employers 
offer flexibility and family-friendly policies unilaterally, unions still have a role to 
play in ensuring equality in the workplace. Unions need to address the concerns of 
agency workers employed on worse terms and conditions to permanent staff in order 
to encourage long-term union membership. In addition, unions are challenged by the 
high turnover of young staff with few outside responsibilities in some sectors. The 
fact that there is little demand for union intervention the new media sector, despite 
long working hours, results in those with family responsibilities being effectively 
excluded. It remains to be seen whether unions can do anything to address this 
exclusion. 
 
Although employees in unionised workplaces are generally satisfied with their 
union, some unions are not yet communicating with employees in a way which 
encourages engagement. In particular, whilst many unions have sought to address 
lesbian and gay issues, it is possible that they could improve their relationship with 
these workers by learning from the experiences of non-union gay and lesbian activist 
groups. Initial research findings suggest that unions need to address the ways in which 
fear of homophobia shapes the employment choices of gay and lesbian workers, and 
their strategy of seeking alternative employment when facing homophobia at work. 
This could be a potentially fruitful area for unions, provided that they address any 
homophobia amongst their existing membership, given that we find gay and lesbian 
workers to be generally supportive of unions. We observe that unions can clearly still 
be successful in achieving gains for their members where membership is high, and so 
the future may be brighter for unions if they can communicate union successes to 
workers as a way of encouraging union membership. The success of the strike by 
local government workers on 17 July suggests that unions have much to gain from 
cooperating with each other at the local level. However, there is also an awareness 
amongst workplace union representatives that where the union is seen to fail workers 
in terms of the negotiating terms and conditions, this makes it harder to sustain levels 
of union membership within individual workplaces. 
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Chapter 10 
The Future of Public Service Unionism in a Restructured Public Sector  
Rebecca Kolins Givan 
(started October 2002) 
 
The future of trade unionism in Britain is bound up with the fortunes and 
prospects of public service trade unions. Trade union density for all public sector 
employees is significantly higher than in the private sector being 59 and 19% 
respectively. Another important feature of trade union membership is the variation 
among occupations, with professionals and associate professionals the most highly 
unionised occupational groups. Consequently public service trade unionism forms the 
bedrock of trade union membership and occupations including nurses, teachers and 
social workers form a central component of union membership. 
 
This research project examines the character of public service trade unionism 
and the manner in which public service trade unions are sustaining union organisation 
and membership amongst public service staff in a period of continuous restructuring. 
It assesses the extent to which a distinctive public service trade union response can be 
discerned that extends beyond the workplace and is sensitive to the interests of public 
service professionals. The response of public service unions to state policy on issues, 
including PFI, form an integral component of the research. 
 
Four key aspects of the public service context influence trade union ideology, 
organisation and methods that have been largely neglected by the literature. First, a 
central feature of public service trade union membership is the extent to which many 
public service trade unions are dominated by professional and associate professional 
occupational groups. As Kelly points out unions may be categorised as being either 
‘moderate’ or ‘militant’ on the basis of five dimensions: goals, membership resources, 
institutional resources, methods and ideology. Membership characteristics could be 
expected to have an important influence in shaping trade union practice. Second, 
many public service unions are organised predominantly in one sub-sector, ensuring 
that they assign a high priority to shaping public policy and employment 
developments in their sector. Third, although formal decision-making and public 
service collective bargaining machinery has been highly centralised, encouraging 
centralised forms of public service organisation, trade unions have also had to contend 
with the diffuse nature of managerial power in the public services. Management 
authority is divided between a number of parties, at different levels within the state, 
with potentially conflicting interests (cf. the fire fighters’ strike). These characteristics 
often spawn formal or informal processes of multi- lateral bargaining. Fourth, public 
service trade union practice has been sensitive to the particular form of the 
employment relationship often referred to as incorporating ‘a public service ethos’. 
This implies a principled framework for action that describes the general 
characteristics of the organisation and the values that motivate those who work for the 
public services. This public service ethos is not confined to any particular 
occupational group but the existence of large numbers of professional staff who have 
traditionally had an important influence over patterns of service provision and that 
wish to safeguard service standards has implications for trade union practice. This 
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may lead public service trade unions to adopt a more campaigning or social 
movement trade unionism. 
 
 
Research questions  
 
This research is concerned to analyse and explain the particular forms that 
trade unionism takes within the public services. It considers the influence of 
professional identities amongst union members in shaping union practice, the patterns 
of workplace organisation, and the extent that public service unionism is influenced 
by developments beyond the workplace. Three sets of questions will inform the 
research: 
 
1. To what extent, and in what ways, do the occupational and professional 
identities of public service workers, often referred to as the ‘public service 
ethos’, influence union practice? 
 
2. How far, and in what ways, are professional and associate professions 
involved in workplace unionism as members, stewards or branch officials? 
 
3. How do members, stewards and branch officials interests and concerns inform 
trade union practice beyond the workplace and influence public policy 
decisions in areas such as PFI? 
 
 
Research methods and sampling framework 
 
These research questions require a research methodology that captures the 
breadth of occupational groups across the public services and probes the variation 
between trade unions. This breadth will be achieved by including the three key 
components of the public services – health, education and social services. These sub-
sectors contain occupational groups especially nurses, teachers and social workers 
that are unionised and are located within the associate professional and professional 
categories. 
 
The use of paired trade union comparisons is primarily designed to identify 
differences in trade union approach towards the recruitment, organisation and  
involvement of professional and associate professions between each union within a 
sub-sector. The aggregate data generated across the sub-sectors will inform broader 
analysis of the distinctive features of public service trade unionism and how the 
characteristics of public service trade unionism can be developed to the advantage of 
trade union members. 
 
The main component of the research will take the form of comparative case 
studies, within each sub-sector with interviews amongst other key actors in the sub-
sector. (see table 10.1). Analysis of trade union policy and practice will be 
inextricably bound up with the concerns of the key membership group, although 
whether these concerns are identified in professional or other terms remains a central 
question of this research study. Within each trade union the sampling frame will focus 
on one region in each case with several branches selected within each region. A 
  81 
central part of the research will be interviews conducted amongst lay activists, branch 
officials, regional officers and national officers. The research will also make use of 
national, regional and branch documentation related to the research agenda and may 
incorporate a more quantitative dimension (e.g. the use of vignette techniques). It will 
be complemented by the observation of union conferences, training events, branch 
meetings and other forums.  
 
 
Table 10.1 
  Health Education Social Services  
  National Regional Local National Regional Local National Regional Local 
Data  WERS   WERS   WERS   
  Review 
body and 
workforce 
data 
  Review 
body and 
workforce 
data 
  Review 
body and 
workforce 
data 
  
Representative 
Bodies: 
More 
professionalised 
         
 (less militant)    ATL& 
PAT 
     
  BMA   NAHT   BASW   
  RCN   SHA      
           
  Amicus    NUT   &  NASUWT  GMB   
 Less 
professionalised 
UNISON      UNISON   
 (more militant)          
Other 
stakeholders 
Employers 
association 
AHHRM   SEO   ASSD   
 Government DoH   DES   DoH   
Regulatory 
bodies 
 NMC   GTC   GSSC   
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Chapter 11 
Trade Unions Outside the Workplace 
Robert Taylor 
(started October 2002) 
 
The main focus of the planned research is to examine the future role of 
Britain’s trade unions in the public arena outside collective bargaining and workplace 
relations. It is concerned with what trade unions are doing in the wider society as 
policy makers, lobbyists and political actors. The topic has four distinctive areas. 
 
 
Unions as influences on public policy making 
 
The future relations between trade unions and the state remain uncertain and 
problematic. But under the direction of the TUC we can expect to see the 
development of a range of relationships with specific government departments on 
particular issues. Some in the unions want to see the emergence of a social partnership 
on the continental European model in a growing number of areas of governance in 
alliance with employer associations and the state. 
 
The study will examine policy areas where the TUC is attempting to develop 
this kind of approach. These will include productivity, training and learning, low pay, 
employment regulation and information and consultation for employees. There will be 
detailed case studies on the current lobbying over the revision of the Employment 
Relations Act and the making of the regulations to cover information and 
consultation. It will also study how particular trade unions are developing public 
policy approaches, with special reference to the public sector and the government’s 
privatisation strategy. 
 
 
Unions and politics 
 
This area will concentrate on the developing relations between trade unions 
and the Labour party. It will look not only at the issue of party funding and the role of 
trade unions in financing party politics but also the role trade unions are playing both 
in the running of the party and in the activities of the parliamentary party. It will 
follow in considerable detail the forthcoming political fund ballots to be held by the 
unions over the next eighteen months. This will provide rich, empirical evidence on 
the role of the unions in the wider political process. 
 
The project will also examine the new generation of trade union leaders who 
are being elected, many with a more left-wing position than their predecessors. This 
would involve face to face interviews with them and others and a close attention to 
their programmes and beliefs. It is necessary not to be parochial. Therefore the role of 
trade unions in politics elsewhere in the world will be examined, particularly in 
European countries like Germany, Sweden, France and Italy but also the United States 
and Australia. An international comparison will help us understand what possible 
ways forward there are for our unions in the political system. 
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Unions and civil society 
 
Trade unions are some of the largest voluntary associations in Britain. An 
increasing number are starting to examine new strategies that reach out beyond the 
workplace to the wider society, especially at community level. The study will explore 
the extent and the limitations on the ability of unions to make alliances with non-
governmental organisations covering the environment, gender and  racial issues, 
transport and economic development at local level. It will also examine trade unions 
in an international setting. Increasingly bodies like Amnesty International, 
Greenpeace and Global Resistance are becoming involved in questions of labour 
rights. 
 
 
Unions in the wider world 
 
Trade unions in Britain are becoming more interested and involved in 
international activities through their work in the European Union and the emerging 
global sector union federations. It is necessary to explore what is happening at this 
level, not least because in the EU we can already see the growth of a new tripartite 
system of influence and policy making that is having a profound effect on UK 
employment law and the role of regulation in industrial relations. Two specific areas 
of inquiry are: the role of the EU on trade union influences and the role of trade 
unions in the globalisation debate. 
 
 
Union development 
 
A wide ranging survey of the unions affiliated to the TUC on their current 
plans for future growth and development is being considered. John Monks is prepared 
to give his support to this project which will be carried out with John Kelly. The 
research approach will be through interviews with trade union officers at different 
levels, an examination of primary material from the unions and a series of visits to 
trade union conference during the spring and summer of 2003. There will also be a 
number of case studies of particular types of trade union. This would cover the top 
five but in addition specific unions who are modernising their current activities in the 
public policy area. 
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DISSEMINATION AND IMPACT 
 
 
Dissemination is initially via the academic community because this ensures 
critical peer review. This is through publications and workshop/conference 
presentations. Next, we make great effort to inform practitioners by events and 
through our own contacts, nurtured over many years. Further, our work often feeds 
into public policy. Finally, our research is disseminated to a wider public audience 
through our friends and contacts in the media. 
 
 
Publications  
 
The normal CEP way of working is to initially produce an internal Working 
Paper. Once it has been presented at a serious seminar or workshop it usually evolves 
into a Discussion Paper (circulated to some 500 people). Most such Discussion Papers 
then, in due course, appear in academic journals or books. Publications are listed 
separately. We have a contract with Routledge to produce three edited books (spring 
2003, 2004, 2005) which will distil the results flowing from the programme. There 
has already been a special issue of CentrePiece (summer 2000) on the Programme and 
in June 2003 there is a special issue of Perspectives on Work, the magazine of the 
American Industrial Relations Association, where findings from the project will be 
disseminated to an international audience. 
 
 
Conferences and workshops  
 
Two major internal events are organised each year (details set out below). In 
the summer we disseminate our research to colleagues from unions, organisations, 
public services and the media. In 2000 talks were given on recognition and family 
friendly policy. In 2001 on the  statutory recognition procedure, attitudes of non-union 
employees towards union membership and unions and the internet. In 2002 the topics 
included social partnership, workplace performance, work- life balance and 
information and consultation.  
 
At Christmas we host a workshop to expose our research to peers and non-
CEP academic colleagues. The 2000 event included papers on: recognition; 
membership; PRP; internet; equal opportunities; and information disclosure. In 2001 
the theme was unions and workplace performance which discussed, among other 
things: wage premium; financial performance; training and the impact of family 
friendly policies. The 2002/03 event focussed on the public sector including: the ethos 
of public sector unionism; membership and pay; gender and the new economy; union 
organising campaigns and payment systems. 
 
In addition in May 2001 we organised, jointly with the Harvard Trade Union 
Program and the TUC, a major international conference on unions and the internet. 
And in autumn 2001 the research officers and assistants organised their own 
workshop where each led a discussion on their research. 
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Programme members have been active out side the CEP too. In 2001 a major 
international conference on the future of unions in Toronto (in honour of Noah Meltz) 
featured papers from Charlwood (organising), Diamond and Freeman (e-organising), 
Gomez (youth), Davies, Moore, Wood and Willman (recognition) and Marsden 
(performance related pay). Three of these papers appeared in a special issue of the 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, September 2002. Fernie gave a paper (on 
partnership) at the Bergamo conference on institutions and outcomes. Gray spoke on 
family friendly policy at the Gender Work and Organisation conference at Keele. 
Gomez, Moore, Gospel and Charlwood discussed research results, respectively, at 
Allied Social Science Conference (New Orleans) BUIRA, Work Employment and 
Society Conference and the WERS users conference. Gospel gave the prestigious 
Foenander Public Lecture at the University of Melbourne.  
 
In 2002 Belfield and Marsden presented a paper on unions and PRP at the 
Brussels meeting of the Applied Econometrics Association. Bewley discussed her 
work on links between equal opportunity and family friendly policy and workplace 
performance at BUIRA in Stirling. Freeman examined unions’ influence on voting 
behaviour at the Cornell Labor Seminar. Gospel presented his research on 
representing workers in the new economy at both Bocconi University in Milan and 
the WZB in Berlin. The Middlebury College (Vermont) conference in April featured 
papers by Gomez on union membership as an experience good and Freeman on 
unions use of the interne t. Ewing presented the case fo r a Charter of Workers Rights 
at fringe meetings at both the TUC and Labour Party. Bryson presented his work on 
unions and voice, job satisfaction, workplace governance and the pay premium at, 
respectively, Hagen (Germany), EALE (Paris), Aarhus and Milan. Flood discussed 
her work on unions and gender at a conference in Sydney and Perrons presented 
findings from her local labour market research at the Regional Science Association, 
Tokyo University and the ESRC series on the geographies of the new economy. 
 
 
Links with unions management and policy makers  
 
Links between the programme and unions are strong. For example, Freeman 
and Diamond organised joint CEP/TUC conferences on both unions and the Internet 
and their research on ‘what workers want’ in terms of voice and representation. This 
research is an important catalyst in getting unions to think carefully how to organise 
and service members via the internet. Bryson has presented his work on union 
effectiveness at the TUC. Charlwood’s work on organising effectiveness was 
discussed with a number of TUC officials. The recognition team maintain contact 
with the TUC and discussed their research with a dozen or so unions. Metcalf 
presented his research on the interactions between outcomes and membership to a 
UNISON workshop. Gray’s research on family friendly policy figures prominently on 
the GMB website. The partnership/organising group, and the newer research on the 
public sector and public face of unions all involve major interaction with specific 
unions. Both union organising and partnership projects are being implemented in 
active collaboration with several trade unions including: UNISON, AMICUS-MSF, 
UNIFI, GPMU and TGWU. The Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) has 
provided valuable assistance on the partnership research. The preliminary findings of 
the partnership research were presented at the UNISON National Seminar of Union 
Organisers in the Health Sector. The partnership research has provided useful insights 
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on the mechanisms and employee-relations outcomes to the organisations 
participating in the project. Likewise, the organising research has provided useful 
diagnostic information to the union, which the officials have used for streamlining the 
union’s communication and information dissemination channels and, training 
workplace reps. 
 
The family friendly research has forged links with senior equality officers 
from the following unions over the past three years: UNISON, USDAW, GMB, 
AMICUS, UNIFI, UKAPE (AMICUS), RCN. These contacts have been made in the 
process of interviewing equality officers from the five largest unions, as well as 
seeking access to unionised workplaces for our case studies of what works for women 
at work. The local labour market study has also established very good links with the 
local branch of the GPMU and a number of LGBT organisations. The GPMU has 
made extensive use of the new media study, and found it helpful in the course of 
negotiations. This study was distributed via a number of e- lists and extracts, and a 
summary report were available on the Wired Sussex website. The project has also 
contributed to the public debate on gender research and social policy through the 
presentation to the Gender Research Forum of the DTI and the Women’s Unit of the 
Cabinet Office. 
 
Gospel’s work on information and consultation was presented to Personnel 
Consultants at Watson Wyatt. Fernie and Gray’s research on family friendly policies 
and performance has been discussed with the CBI, EOC, DTI and OECD as well as a 
number of unions (e.g. NUT). Bryson’s work on unions, the climate of employment 
relations and performance was discussed with DTI. The recognition team have 
maintained strong links with CAC, ACAS, the DTI, CBI and CIPD (as well as 
participating unions and firms). The team made a presentation in June 2002 to the 
DTI group reviewing the Employment Relations Act, and have sustained contact with 
TUC to analyse the research. The TUC’s own submission to the review drew on our 
research. Machin’s research on unions, technical change and inequality was discussed 
with the Asian Development Bank. Gospel’s enduring work on corporate governance, 
voice and responsibility was shared with both ILO and EU forums. Belfield and 
Marsden’s research on performance related pay has informed discussion in, for 
example, the DfEE and Inland Revenue. Willman and Gospel advised the Cabinet 
Office on their 2002 Green paper ‘High Performance Workplaces: the Role of 
Employee Involvement in a Modern Economy’. 
 
 
Dissemination via media 
 
Popular articles on the programme research have been published in, for 
example, Labour Research (recognition) the New Statesman (outcomes and 
membership and new union leaders), Financial Times (stakeholding) and the Times 
Higher Education Supplement (unions and PRP). The research has been quoted 
extensively in, for example, Guardian, The Economist, Financial Times, IRS 
Employment Trends, Labour Research, Socialist Worker and various union web sites. 
 
Members of the programme made a number of media appearances which drew 
on their research including BBC TV (Breakfast Programme, Ten O’clock News, 
Newsnight), Radio 4 (e.g. Today, World Tonight) Radio 2 (e.g. Jimmy Young show), 
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TalkSport and local radio. Gospel was academic adviser and anchorman on the three 
part BBC Radio 4 series ‘The Apprentices’ which dealt with the role of trade unions 
in apprenticeship training. A number of articles on our research have been published 
in CentrePiece, the CEP magazine, including analysis of membership, family friendly 
policies, unions and the internet, and performance related pay for teachers. 
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The Future of Trade Unions in Modern Britain 
 
Dissemination Events, Workshops & 
Conferences 
 
2000 – 2002 
 
 
 
 
1. Programme Launch – Friday 19 May 2000 
 
 
2. Workshop Programme – Tuesday 12 December 2000 
 
 
3. Unions and the Internet Conference – Friday 11 
May 2001 
 
 
4. Dissemination Seminar – Wednesday 20 June 2001 
 
 
5. Unions and Performance: What’s Going On? – 
Thursday 13 December 2001 
 
 
6. Research Officers & Assistants Weekly Workshop – 
October – December 2001 
 
 
7. Dissemination Seminar – Thursday 18 July 2002 
 
8. Seminar on Public Sector Research – Thursday 9 
January 2003 
 
 
 Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE 
Future_of_unions@lse.ac.uk 
The Future of Trade Unions in Modern Britain 
Leverhulme Trust Research Programme, 2000 - 2005 
 
PROGRAMME LAUNCH 
 
Friday May 19, 2000, 11am – 1pm 
 
CEP Conference Room 
3rd Floor, 10 Furnival Street, EC4A 1AH 
London (nearest tube: Chancery Lane) 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance at LSE has awarded a substantial grant 
by the Leverhulme Trust to examine the future of Trade Unions in Britain.  
The research programme will comprise 15 separate projects, each run by a 
leading expert in the field. 
 
Timetable: 
 
10:45am Coffee 
11:00am David Metcalf will introduce the overall programme 
11:10am Sue Fernie will discuss initial research finding concerning 
  the role of trade unions in family friendly policies 
11:20am Steve Machin will analyse union recognition in the light of 
  the new Employment Relations Act 
11:30am “CentrePiece”.  This is a three times a year magazine  
  disseminating the CEP research.  The Spring issue, also  
  launched on 19 May, is devoted entirely to union matters 
11:45am Informal discussion 
12:30pm Buffet lunch including wine 
 
 
The information pack to be handed out will include: 
· Discussion Papers on union recognition, unions and pay distribution 
and provision of information 
· “CentrePiece” Spring Issue 
· Full details of the programme, 2000-2005 
 Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE 
Future_of_unions@lse.ac.uk 
The Future of Trade Unions in Modern Britain 
Leverhulme Trust Research Programme, 2000 - 2005 
 
Workshop 1 
Tuesday 12 December, 2000, 10am 
CEP Conference room 
3rd Floor, 10 Furnival Street 
(Chancery Lane tube) 
 
Workshop Program 
 
9.30am Coffee 
 
 
10am – 1pm Chair: 
 
Legal underpinnings 
Recognition 
Tom Kochan (MIT) 
 
 
Stephen Wood, Paul Davies, 
Sian Moore 
Discussant : Roy Lewis 
 
 Membership, growth and survival 
Membership determinants 
 
Andy Charlwood 
Discussant : Bob Elliott 
 
 Inside the firm 
PRP and procedural justice – the 
case of teachers 
 
David Marsden 
Discussant : Hannah Reed 
 
 Unions and the internet Richard Freeman and Wayne 
Diamond 
 
1pm – 2pm Lunch 
 
 
2pm – 5pm Chair: 
 
Inside the firm (continued) 
EEO and family friendly policies 
Sonia McKay (LRD) 
 
 
Sue Fernie, Helen Gray 
Discussant : Annie McBride 
 
 Legal underpinnings 
Disclosure 
 
Howard Gospel 
Discussant : Peter Carter 
 
 Membership, growth and survival 
Dissolution or resurgence revisited 
 
David Metcalf 
Discussant: John Fisher 
 
5pm close 6pm evening meal at Bahti’s (curry house). The restaurant is nearby, 
details on the day. 
  
Unions & 
The Internet 
 
Unions & the Internet Conference 
May 11th 2001 
TUC Congress House, London UK 
 
Centre for Economic Performance, LSE 
Harvard Trade Union Program 
Trades Union Congress 
 
 
Thanks to the Following Foundations: 
 
Ford Foundation 
Mellon Foundation 
Leverhulme Trust 
 
 
Contents of Conference 
 
1. Cyber-advocacy and E-collectivism: the Internet 
and Social Organisations 
2. Union use of the Internet to reach the Non-
organised Worker 
3. On-line Provision of Services for Working People 
4. How are National and International Federations 
making use of the Internet 
5. Effect of Internet on Union – Some Current 
Practices 
6. Blue Sky – a New E-union 
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Dissemination Seminar 
Wednesday 20 June, 2001, 10am 
CEP Conference Centre, Lionel Robbins Building 
10 Portugal Street 
London WC2 
 
Agenda 
 
10.00am 
 
 
Introduction David Metcalf 
 
10.10am  
 
 
The statutory recognition procedure – the union 
response 
Sian Moore 
10.25am   
 
 
Discussion Discussant –  
Sarah Veale (TUC) 
10.50am   
 
 
The attitudes of non-union employees towards  
union membership 
Andy Charlwood 
11.05am  
 
Discussion Discussant –  
Frances O’Grady (TUC) 
11.30am   
 
 
Coffee  
11.40am  
 
 
Family-friendly working: what a performance! Helen Gray 
11.55am Discussion Discussant –  
Gill Dix (ACAS) 
 
12.20pm 
 
 
Representation and Participation in Cyber-Space: 
the promise of the Internet for employee organisation 
 
 
Wayne Diamond 
12.35pm  
 
Discussion Discussant – 
John Earls (Unify) 
 
1.00 pm Close and lunch  
 
 Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE 
Future_of_unions@lse.ac.uk 
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Leverhulme Trust Research Programme 2000-2005 
 
 
Unions and Performance: What’s going on? 
CEP seminar, CEP seminar room, 13th December 2001 
 
 
Each slot to comprise a paper of 15-20 minutes and discussion for the remainder 
 
10.00 Coffee 
 
10.30 Unions and Performance: What’s going on? 
Alex Bryson (Policy Studies Institute) 
 
11.00 What’s inside the black box? 
Professor William Brown (University of Cambridge) 
 
11.35 The Union Wage Premium: Substantive and Methodological issues 
John Forth and Neil Millward (NIESR) 
 
12.10 Unions and Financial Performance 
David Wilkinson (Policy Studies Institute) 
 
12.45 Some reflections  
Professor Alan Manning (LSE) 
 
13.00 Lunch 
 
 
14.00 Unions and training 
Professor Alison Booth (University of Essex) 
 
14.35 Unions, HRM and Performance 
Professor Keith Whitfield, (Cardiff Business School) 
 
15.10 Unions, Family Friendly Practices and Performance 
Helen Gray (LSE) 
 
15.45 More reflections  
Professor Richard Freeman (Harvard and LSE) 
 
16.15 Closing remarks 
 
16.30 Tea and biscuits 
 Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE 
Future_of_unions@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 
The Future of Trade Unions in Modern Britain 
Leverhulme Trust Research Programme 2000-2005 
 
 
Research Officers and Assistants 
Weekly Workshop 
 
 
Name Topic 
Wayne Diamond TUC Survey 
Helen Gray Case Studies: Qualitative Issues 
Richard Belfield Intra-establishment Pay Dispersion and Economic 
Performance 
Jo Blanden Cross Generation Correlations of Union Membership 
Sian Moore Statutory Recognition 
Vidu Badigannavar Industrial Relations Outcomes and Social Partnership 
Róisín Ryan-Flood Unions and the Pink Economy: a Case Study of 
Brighton and Hove 
 
 
Workshops held on Tuesday’s @ 2.00pm in the CEP Library, October-
December 2001 
 
Each slot lasts approximately 1 hour – 20-30 minutes for presenter and the 
remainder of the time for discussion 
 Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE 
Future_of_unions@lse.ac.uk 
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Dissemination Seminar Thursday July 18th 2002 
 
 
Agenda 
 
10.00 Coffee 
 
 
10.15am-10.25am Social partnership and John Kelly 
 union organising  
10.25am-10.45am Discussion 
 
 
10.45am-10.55am Unions and performance Alex Bryson 
10.55am-11.15pm Discussion  
   
11.15am-11.30am Break 
 
 
11.30am-11.40am Work-life balance, equity 
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